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ARTICLE
A CONTRACTUAL APPROACH TO
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION LAW
Benjamin Means*
According to standard law and economics, minority shareholders in
closely held corporations must bargain against opportunism by controlling
shareholders before investing. Put simply, you made your bed, now you
must lie in it. Yet most courts offer a remedy for shareholder oppression,
often premised on the notion that controlling shareholders owe fiduciary
duties to the minority or must honor the minority’s reasonable expectations.
Thus, law and economics, the dominant mode of corporate law scholarship,
appears irreconcilably opposed to minority shareholder protection, a
defining feature of the existing law of close corporations.
This Article contends that a more nuanced theory of contract—freed from
the limiting assumptions of standard law and economics—offers a
persuasive justification for judicial protection of vulnerable minority
shareholders. Moreover, although courts often describe the shareholder
relationship in fiduciary terms, contract theory provides a more coherent
explanation of current doctrine. The “contractarian” objection to
shareholder protection poses a false choice between fairness and
autonomy: by enforcing the implicit contractual obligations of good faith
and fair dealing, courts protect minority shareholders from oppression and,
at the same time, advance the values of private ordering.
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INTRODUCTION
According to standard law and economics, minority shareholders in
closely held corporations must bargain for protection against opportunism
by controlling shareholders before investing.1 Close corporations, after all,
contain relatively few shareholders, lowering the cost of bargaining to
manageable levels.2 Put simply, you made your bed, now you must lie in
it.3
1. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 830 (2002)
(“[P]arties who want liberal dissolution rights may bargain for them . . . before investing.”);
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 229 (1991) (“[I]t is essential to use contractual devices to keep people in a position to
receive the return on their investment.”); Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of
Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 221 (2004) (asserting that any
interference by courts would “rewrite the contract and provide a windfall to the minority”);
Larry E. Ribstein, The Closely Held Firm: A View from the United States, 19 MELB. U. L.
REV. 950, 955 (1994) (“[J]udicially-administered remedies threaten the security of the
agreements the parties have made.”); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for
the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations,
24 J. CORP. L. 913, 915 (1999) (“[T]he question [is] what, if anything, the courts should do
for the minority shareholders in cases where the parties have not provided for the problem by
contract. Our basic answer is that courts should not do anything except enforce the
participants’ contracts and vigorously prevent non pro rata distributions to shareholders.”).
2. The shareholders can all fit around a bargaining table, and “[c]orporation statutes in
all states now allow shareholders substantial freedom to modify the corporate adaptive rules
by unanimous contractual agreement.” Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close
Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 242 (1992);
see also Robert B. Thompson, The Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP.
L. 377, 378 (1990) (same).
3. See Paula J. Dalley, Shareholder (and Director) Fiduciary Duties and Shareholder
Activism, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 301, 320–21 (2008) (arguing that just as “Enron
shareholder-employees made their own beds by failing to diversify their retirement account
holdings . . . [t]he same is true of ‘oppressed’ shareholders in close corporations . . . who
willingly (although perhaps unwisely) chose to invest as minority shareholders”).
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Yet, courts in most jurisdictions reject a narrowly contractual view of
shareholder relationships and offer a remedy for shareholder oppression in
closely held corporations, often premised on the notion that controlling
shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the minority or must honor the
minority’s reasonable expectations.4 Thus, law and economics, the
dominant mode of corporate law scholarship,5 appears irreconcilably
opposed to minority shareholder protection, a defining feature of the
existing law of close corporations.6
This Article contends that the “contractarian”7 objection to shareholder
oppression doctrine is wrong for two principal reasons. First, the objection
rests upon a false premise; according to standard economic theory, a
rational shareholder will always bargain at arm’s length for adequate
protection before agreeing to invest in a closely held corporation.8 In
reality, small business investors are not always sophisticated, founding a
business is an inherently hopeful act, and fellow investors are often family
members or friends. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that investors
often fail to anticipate and bargain against future oppression, especially
regarding problems that may not surface until later generations assume
control of the business. The rational actor model of human behavior bears
at most an approximate relation to reality.9
Second, even someone who reliably perceived and rationally pursued
whatever advanced her own self-interest might fall victim to oppression as a
minority shareholder. If this hypothetical, economically rational investor
hoped to negotiate all points at arm’s length before investing, she would
soon confront the cruel reality of transaction costs. Bargaining takes time
4. See John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority
Oppression in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657 (2007) (surveying state
law); Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts: Is the
Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1002 (2001) (observing
that “courts have increasingly used [reasonable expectations analysis] to determine whether
oppressive conduct has taken place”). For a latecomer to the party, see McLaughlin v.
Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 150 (Utah 2009), which held in a case of first impression that
minority shareholders are owed a fiduciary duty of “utmost good faith.”
5. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 129, 142 (2003) (“[T]here is no dispute that law and economics has long been, and
continues to be, the dominant theoretical paradigm for understanding and assessing law and
policy.”).
6. Only two states have definitively rejected special protection for minority
shareholders. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379–81 (Del. 1993); Richards v.
Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 648 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
7. By “contractarian,” I mean those who “view corporate law as simply a modest
extension of contract law.” John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1619 (1989).
8. See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1871 (1991) (“Because it is generally feasible for the
small number of shareholders in a close corporation to bargain among themselves, one view
of the appropriate hypothetical bargain . . . would leave these questions to express
contract.”).
9. As discussed infra Part III, the rational actor is a figment of abstract economic
models.
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and costs money; even if an investor has plenty of both, and thinks added
clarity is worth the bother, there is a limit to what can be effectively dealt
with ahead of time.10 Also, social relationships matter, and rational
shareholders may prefer to rely on trust—without which a small business
venture would never be attempted—even when explicit contractual
solutions are available.11
In a long-term contract rife with gaps that a party can exploit to further its
own interests at the expense of the other parties to the agreement, the
possibility of bad-faith opportunism12 is ever-present and robust judicial
monitoring seems not only helpful, but necessary.13 The serious question is
thus not whether to protect minority shareholders, but how to do it. This
Article contends that courts need not (and should not) apply a free-floating
norm of fairness, judged after the fact, to resolve shareholder disputes.
Courts that instead protect all shareholders’ reasonable expectations by
enforcing well-established, equitable principles of contract, including the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,14 facilitate private ordering.
Shareholders can invest without undue fear of ex post opportunism or
judicial revision of the terms of the bargain.15
10. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 108 (2010) (“[C]lose
corporation owners often either lacked the foresight to plan for the breakdown of their
relationship, or could not easily figure out how to balance the dangers of freeze-in against
the risk that a member would use a power to dissolve the corporation to oust a comember.”).
11. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1805 (2001) (“The
phenomenon of trust behavior suggests . . . that sometimes participants in closely held
corporations may deliberately choose not to draft formal contracts, even when they could do
so.”).
12. Opportunism involves more than economic self-interest. According to one scholar, a
party acts opportunistically if it “behaves contrary to the other party’s understanding of their
contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement’s explicit terms, leading to a transfer
of wealth from the other party.” Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of
Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521 (1981). Opportunism implies an element of bad faith.
See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 834
(2002) (contending that opportunism requires “bad faith exploitation of uncertainty”);
O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 222 (“Opportunistic actors seek to extract an advantage which
would be denied them if the party with whom they deal had full information.”).
13. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1620 (arguing that in “long-term contracting . . . judicial
involvement is not an aberration but an integral part of such contracting”). Coffee describes
judicial monitoring as a “key tradeoff” in that “we counterbalance contractual freedom with
ex post judicial review.” Id. at 1620–21. For a related argument, see Thompson, supra note
2, at 394 (“A close corporation is like a long-term relational contract in which benefits for all
parties necessarily depend on unstated assumptions. A fully contingent contract cannot be
drafted, so some ex post settling up by courts is used to support these assumptions.”). This
Article builds on Coffee’s and Thompson’s helpful analyses of the judicial role but resists
the notion that there is a necessary tradeoff to be made. Although the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is mandatory, its purpose is to protect the parties’ bargain, not to restrict the
permissible subject matter of the bargain.
14. The duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied as a mandatory term in all
contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
15. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 166 (“[C]ontrolling shareholders should not have
fiduciary duties to noncontrolling shareholders . . . . [T]he law need only constrain
opportunism by holding the controller to its express or implied contractual obligations,
including the duty of good faith . . . .”). Even though Professor Ribstein takes a relatively
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This Article’s central contention is that a more nuanced theory of
contract—freed from the limiting assumptions of standard law and
economics—offers a persuasive justification for judicial protection of
vulnerable minority shareholders in close corporations. Moreover, although
courts often describe the shareholder relationship in fiduciary terms,
contract theory provides a more coherent explanation of current doctrine.
In short, the contractarian objection to shareholder protection poses a false
choice between fairness and autonomy. By instead enforcing the implicit
contractual obligations of good faith and fair dealing, courts can protect
minority shareholders from oppression and, at the same time, advance the
values of private ordering.
Part II briefly describes the problem of minority shareholder oppression
in close corporations and sets forth the standard law and economics
objection to judicial intervention. According to this view, shareholder
relationships in a close corporation are defined by contract (including the
contractual choice of business form).16 Using the familiar “nexus of
contracts” theory of the firm,17 law and economics scholars advance two
claims: (1) that shareholder investment decisions can best be understood
via the rational actor theory of choice, which posits that people act to
maximize their self-interest, however they may define it;18 and (2) that
courts should enforce the parties’ explicit bargain (including any
background rules of corporate law) to avoid inefficient meddling with
private ordering.19
Part III argues that the rational actor theory underlying the contractarian
view offers a not-merely simplified but shoddy description of decisions
made by close corporation shareholders, especially in family corporations.
More recent behavioral economic theory, grounded in cognitive
narrow view of equitable protection, given the parties’ ability to protect themselves through
explicit contract, this statement of principle seems exactly right. Indeed, as discussed infra
Part V, disagreement concerning the scope of equitable contract offers a locus for
constructive engagement between law and economics and more progressive legal
approaches. Instead, a lingering and calcified dispute between “contractarian” and “anticontractarian” perspectives on corporate governance appears to have blocked progress
toward a consensus concerning shareholder oppression law.
16. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 229.
17. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 8 (“[T]he corporation is not a thing, but rather a
web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations . . . .”).
18. See, e.g., id. at 23 (“[N]eoclassical economics is premised on rational choice theory,
which posits an autonomous individual who makes rational choices that maximize his
satisfactions.”); AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY & FREEDOM 26 (2002) (“It must, however, be
accepted that despite the limited reach of the self-interest approach to rationality, it is widely
used not only in economics, but also in ‘rational choice’ models in politics and the
increasingly important subject of ‘law and economics.’”); John Ferejohn, Rationality and
Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England, in THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO POLITICS 279, 281 (Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 1991) (“[R]ational choice
theorists are committed to a principle of universality: (all) agents act always to maximize
their well-being as they understand it . . . .”).
19. See Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37
GA. L. REV. 363, 395 (2003) (“As long as this choice relies on contracts between parties who
are motivated to act in their own interests, bargain freely, and internalize the costs and
benefits of the deal, enforcing contractual choice produces ‘Pareto’ wealth maximization.”).
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psychology, helps to explain why shareholders systematically fail to do
what the rational actor theory predicts.20 Like the rest of us, shareholders in
close corporations are imperfectly rational and tend to underestimate the
likelihood of future strife.21
Part IV contends that a narrow focus on the terms of the shareholder
bargain fails to account for transaction costs and misses the substantial
benefit of social norms that encourage cooperation and trust. As law and
economics scholars concede, shareholders cannot bargain in advance
concerning every specific issue that might arise.22 Nor would shareholders
necessarily want to tie their hands in advance.23 The alternative contractual
approach—allocating general control rights ex ante—causes as many
problems as it solves, because minority veto and majority fiat can both be
used opportunistically to extract a disproportionate share of the
investment.24 Moreover, some issues that might be addressed satisfactorily
pre-investment may be left open on purpose; close-corporation shareholders
may deliberately avoid extensive contractual negotiation to preserve the
trust that makes the business form desirable in the first instance.25
Part V shows that equitable principles of contract can accommodate the
needs of investors committing to a long-term relationship as shareholders of
a corporation. In particular, the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied
in every contract gives courts an appropriate method for resolving
shareholder disputes in close corporations. Contract theory, in fact, better
explains existing shareholder oppression doctrine than does the imprecise
invocation of fiduciary duty. Rather than settle for simplified and
20. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). For an argument “that economic analysis has failed to
produce an ‘economic theory’ of contract law,” see Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of
Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003).
Professor Posner observes that “[t]he premises of economics push in the direction of
freedom of contract . . . [a]nd yet courts do not always enforce the terms of contracts.” Id. at
842. Indeed, “[t]hey often refuse to enforce terms that seem . . . oppressive . . . .” Id.
Moreover, normative economic analysis relies on models that are either too simple to be
useful in the real world or else too complex to provide determinate guidance. Id. at 880.
21. Behavioral economics supports what scholars have long observed. See, e.g., F.
Hodge O’Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 121, 124 (1987) (“Unfortunately the atmosphere of optimism and goodwill
which prevails during the initial stages of a business undertaking usually obscures the
possibility of future . . . conflicts . . . .”).
22. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 34 (“Even when they work through
all the issues they expect to arise, [venturers] are apt to miss something. All sorts of
complexities will arise later.”).
23. See O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 225 (“[W]hile contractual specification of rights and
duties may provide protection against opportunistic withdrawal, the parties may also incur
significant costs from lost flexibility.”).
24. See, e.g., id., at 239 (contending that rational investors will select the corporate form
when they “attach greater value to the firm’s adaptability . . . and to elimination of the risk of
shirking or opportunistic use of withdrawal rights by a minority shareholder than to the value
of guaranteeing a minority shareholder’s right to continue as an employee, to share ratably in
the firm’s profits, or to withdraw money capital”).
25. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1807 (“[A]ttempts to use contracts in
relationships in which trust plays a central role can prove counterproductive and promote
exactly the sort of opportunistic behavior they were intended to discourage.”).
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unsatisfying assumptions, contract theory incorporates asymmetries,
incompleteness, and relational rather than discrete exchanges.26 The law
and economics refrain, “you made your bed, now you must lie in it,”27 is a
pithy but empty phrase.28
The standard law and economics argument gains little force when recast
as a choice-of-form argument based on the availability of the LLC, a newer
hybrid business form that combines certain features of partnership law with
the limited liability of corporation law.29 If one doubts the ability of
investors to bargain effectively in advance because of transaction costs, and,
in many cases, family and other intimate connections, the same problems
will arise in the LLC context.30 Despite their differences, LLCs and close
corporations both involve long-term relationships and incomplete
contractual bargaining; the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
should apply in either context to protect against opportunistic overreaching.
I. THE CONTRACTARIAN OBJECTION TO SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
The predicament of the minority shareholder in a closely held corporation
is easily stated. A corporation’s board of directors, elected by a majority of
the shareholders, has the sole authority to decide whether to issue dividends
and what salaries to pay managers and employees; moreover, courts
traditionally refuse to second-guess business decisions made by corporate
managers.31 Thus, using established mechanisms of corporate governance,
controlling shareholders can exclude minority shareholders from any role in
the corporation.32 Minority shareholders are particularly vulnerable to

26. See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 2 (2005)
(stating that “much of the existing theory of long-term or dynamic contracting was
developed in the 1980s and 1990s” and that “[t]hese notions . . . complete the foundations
for a full-fledged theory of the firm and organizations”).
27. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary
Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 335, 346 (2007) (identifying in
corporate law “a basic principle, captured by the colloquialism ‘you made your bed, now you
have to lie in it’”).
28. If we want to take the metaphor seriously, we should observe that there are many
people involved in making the bed, the bed frame cannot really be adjusted, and the people
who may eventually find that the bed is uncomfortable may not even be born yet.
29. See infra Part V.C.
30. See Sandra K. Miller et al., An Empirical Glimpse into Limited Liability Companies:
Assessing the Need To Protect Minority Investors, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 609, 613 (2006)
(“[M]inority LLC investors tend to be more vulnerable than their close corporation
counterparts.”); Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company:
Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 896
(2005) (“[T]he problem of oppression is ‘portable’ to the LLC context, as the LLC shares
certain core features of the close corporation.”).
31. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 242 (“[T]he business judgment rule says that
courts must defer to the board of directors’ judgment absent highly unusual exceptions.”).
32. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable Expectations: Of
Change, Gifts, and Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717, 717
(2002) (stating that “oppression doctrine combats majority shareholder efforts to exclude a
minority investor from the company’s financial and participatory benefits”); D. Gordon
Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 309 n.153 (1998).
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these “freeze-out” techniques, because they cannot sell their shares and
therefore have no other way to earn a return on their investment.33
The standard law and economics rejoinder to the alleged problem of
shareholder oppression is also easily stated. According to this view, courts
should restrict their focus to the parties’ actual bargain, including the choice
of business form, and should not provide any special protection to minority
shareholders in close corporations.34 Shareholders, majority or minority,
who want a different deal have every incentive to negotiate for it and can be
assumed to act rationally in their own best interests.35
A. You Get What You Bargain For
Those who oppose minority shareholder protections argue that regardless
of the sympathy that courts may feel for minority shareholders trapped in an
investment gone sour,36 there is no justification for the imposition of
fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders.37 As one scholar puts it,
“Controlling stockholders’ fiduciary duties are a judicial invention
stimulated by a desire to provide relief to minority stockholders who later
regretted their own or their decedent’s bargains and encouraged by scholars
advocating a neo-marxist view of investing.”38 Like any other contract, the
parties’ ex ante agreement should control.
The argument assumes, of course, that contract theory explains corporate
law.
Notably, law and economics scholars reject the traditional
corporation-as-person metaphor39 and contend that the corporation is better
understood as a nexus of contracts among various constituencies, including
shareholders, directors, officers, and employees.40 This “contractarian
33. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 3:1, at 3–2 (rev. 2d ed. 2005); O’Neal, supra note 21,
at 126 (“[D]ischarge of the shareholder-employee often produces an immediate financial
crisis for him.”); see also Brooks v. Hill, 717 So. 2d 759, 765 (Ala. 1998) (“[B]ecause of the
minority shareholder’s prospect of being cut off from corporate income and privileges, the
plight of a minority shareholder in a close corporation, as distinguished from both a partner
in a partnership and a minority shareholder in a publicly traded corporation, is unique.”).
34. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 273 (1986) (“[T]here is no reason to believe that shareholders
of either closely or publicly held corporations will be more or less ‘exploited.’ No a priori
case can be made for greater legal intervention in closely or publicly held corporations.”).
35. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 798 (“Investors would be foolish to agree to invest
in the business, but leave planning details about the firm until the future. Instead, they
should settle the critical questions in advance . . . .”).
36. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993) (“It is not difficult to be
sympathetic, in the abstract, to a stockholder who finds himself or herself in that position.”).
37. See Dalley, supra note 1, at 176 (“[B]asic principles of corporate and agency law,
properly understood, provide all the protection stockholders need and provide a more
workable framework for evaluating stockholder behavior.”).
38. Id. at 222.
39. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 8 (“Despite the utility of the fiction of corporate
legal personhood, it is critical to remember that treating the corporation as an entity separate
from the people making it up bears no relation to economic reality.”).
40. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation
Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 779–80 (2006) (“The core innovation of the theory was to
conceptualize the relationship between managers and shareholders of a public company as
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model [has] cemented its hold on corporate law scholarship . . . .”41 By
focusing upon contract, rather than the public dimension of corporate law,
the metaphor emphasizes private ordering.42 According to the logic of
private ordering, corporation law should provide default principles for the
parties to accept or modify.43
To see why standard law and economics places such strong emphasis on
the parties’ freedom to negotiate, it is important to understand the
underlying theory of human behavior. When parties enter into a contract,
they cannot know what the future will hold.44 They must evaluate and
allocate risk, including unforeseen risk.45 Any theory of contract must
explain how the parties will (or should) respond to uncertainty.46
B. Rational Choice Theory
According to standard law and economics, the rational actor model of
decisionmaking can predict a contracting party’s evaluation of contractual
uncertainty.47 A rational actor takes into account all available information
and picks the best means of accomplishing her goals.48 Thus, “[s]tandard
one of contract—a ‘corporate contract’—in which joint wealth would be maximized . . . .”);
cf. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 6 (2004) (“As an
economic entity, a firm fundamentally serves as a nexus of contracts: a single contracting
party that coordinates the activities of suppliers of inputs and of consumers of products and
services.”).
41. Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law,
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 796 (2002).
42. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 8 (“Nexus of contracts theory has pervasive
implications, both descriptively and normatively, for our understanding of the corporation.”);
Thompson, supra note 2, at 378 (observing that mandatory constraints are inconsistent with
the nexus of contract theory).
43. Whatever its merits as a normative claim, the characterization of corporate law rules
as default settings is a highly selective one. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (1989) (observing that corporations
consist of rules, some determined by “contract or other forms of agreement” and
“[s]ome . . . determined by law”).
44. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 213 (1995) (“Contracts concern the future, and are therefore always
made under conditions of uncertainty.”).
45. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA.
L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1981) (noting that “contract rules serve as . . . risk allocations”).
46. See id.
47. See Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 213. For a discussion of rational actor theory, see
JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 191–213 (2007). Professor Elster summarizes rational choice theory as follows:
“An action is rational . . . if it meets three optimality requirements: the action must be
optimal, given the beliefs; the beliefs must be as well supported as possible, given the
evidence; and the evidence must result from an optimal investment in information
gathering.” Id. at 191 (emphasis omitted).
48. See Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (1998) (noting law and economics “assumption that
individuals choose rationally” and without any systematic biases); see also Eisenberg, supra
note 44, at 213. As Professor Eisenberg explains, the rational actor theory assumes:
that individual decisionmakers can compute (subjective) probability estimates of
uncertain future events; that they perceive accurately the dollar cost or outcome of
the uncertain outcomes; that they know their own attitudes toward risk; that they

1170

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

economics assumes . . . that we are cognitively unhindered in weighing the
ramifications of each potential choice.”49 To be rational, one must act upon
adequate information to maximize one’s own perceived utility
unencumbered by relationships with other people and free of any other
cognitive biases or limitations.50
Although rational actor theory is sometimes understood to require
relentless selfishness, it applies to means, not ends, and can accommodate
socially-motivated preferences for charity as easily as a self-interested
desire for personal gain.51 Rational choice theory takes all preferences as
given, so long as they are internally consistent.52 Thus, even if law and
economics tends to assume self-interested behavior, economic analysis can
accommodate the fact that human beings are social animals and not
motivated exclusively by self-interest.53 The mechanism for doing so—
combine this information about probabilities, monetary values of outcomes, and
attitudes toward risk to calculate the expected utilities of alternative courses of
action and choose that action that maximizes their expected utility.
Id. (quoting Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12
HAMLINE L. REV. 385, 386 (1989)).
49. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 239 (2008). Professor Ariely observes,
“even if we make a wrong decision from time to time, the standard economics perspective
suggests that we will quickly learn . . . either on our own or with the help of ‘market
forces.’” Id.
50. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976)
(contending that individuals “maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and
accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets”).
The rational choice vision can be described as a kind of modern stoicism:
This is the ideal of the disengaged self, capable of objectifying not only the
surrounding world but also his own emotions and inclinations, fears and
compulsions, and achieving thereby a kind of distance and self-possession which
allows him to act ‘rationally’. . . . Reason is no longer defined in terms of a vision
of order in the cosmos, but rather is defined procedurally, in terms of instrumental
efficacy, or maximization of the value sought, or self-consistency.
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 21 (1989).
51. On a stricter view of neoclassical economics, an individual values “payoffs to other
individuals only insofar as these influence his own payoff.” Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis,
Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations, 33
ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 45 (2007) (stating that “experimental evidence . . . rejects the selfishness
assumption routinely made in economics”); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1808
(criticizing law and economics by citing “extensive empirical evidence” that “most people
shift readily from purely self-interested to other-regarding modes of behavior depending
on . . . social context”).
52. Rational choice theory accommodates plainly irrational desires. See, e.g., SEN, supra
note 18, at 39 (pointing out that if someone decides to cut off his toes, rational choice theory
would decide whether or not he is rational by examining whether he has selected a sharp
enough knife). But the rational actor theory does not purport to be a full account of human
reason. For instance, many people drive because they “have an irrational fear of flying.”
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1551, 1554 (1998). They “want above all to avoid being killed; yet they choose the more
dangerous mode anyway.” Id. Posner asserts, however, that “[a] preference can be taken as
a given, and economic analysis proceed as usual, even if the preference is irrational.” Id.
Although irrationally afraid of airplanes, nervous flyers still respond to changes in ticket
price when choosing whether to drive or fly. Id. at 1559 n.16.
53. Although some economists continue to assume that individuals act to maximize selfinterest, “[t]he discrepancy between the traditional theory and experimental results has
driven several economists to develop a theory of ‘social preferences’ that incorporates
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describing other-oriented motives in terms of the actor’s own personal
utility—is ungainly but perhaps serviceable.
However, if we cannot look behind the preference to address whether or
not it is rational—as might be possible if we could evaluate preferences
against a narrow conception of self-interest—then we cannot know whether
a vulnerable minority shareholder has behaved irrationally. Without
substantive constraints on rational choice, we can always construct a
preference that the contractual arrangement serves. This creates two related
difficulties.
First, if we identify individuals’ preferences by working backward from
their choices, then the rational actor model is tautological.54 The definition
of rationality excludes unsuitable governance arrangements.55 As the
Delaware Supreme Court has stated, “The tools of good corporate practice
are designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to
bargain for protection before parting with consideration.”56 Because
rational minority shareholders would take reasonable steps to protect the
value of their investment, the controlling shareholders’ conduct, if within
the bounds of the agreement, is not oppression. On this view, courts should
not interfere with voluntary agreements to provide benefits unavailable
through negotiation.57
Second, because rational choice theory takes all preferences as a given,
law and economics scholars cannot claim that corporate law rules are well
designed to serve wealth-maximizing goals in the close corporation context.
This inherent limitation is easy to overlook. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook
and Professor Daniel R. Fischel, for example, note that there are a variety of
business forms available and conclude that “[a]t the margin the problems
must be equally severe, the mechanisms equally effective—were it
otherwise, investors would transfer their money from one form [of
preferences for other-regarding behavior . . . .” Mizuho Shinada & Toshio Yamagishi,
Bringing Back Leviathan into Social Dilemmas, in NEW ISSUES AND PARADIGMS IN
RESEARCH ON SOCIAL DILEMMAS 93, 94 (A. Biel et al. eds., 2008). For a recent critique of
economic theories that focus upon self-interested choice, see Ronald J. Colombo, Exposing
the Myth of Homo Economicus, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 737 (2009) (reviewing MORAL
MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008)).
54. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 54 (“Trying to explain [a] choice by
its . . . consequences is a form of ‘rational-choice functionalism’ . . . that sheds no light on
the meaning of the behavior.”); Ferejohn, supra note 18, at 281 (“Rational choice
theory . . . constructs explanations by ‘reconstructing’ patterns of meanings and
understandings (preferences and beliefs) in such a way that agents’ actions can be seen as
maximal, given their beliefs.”).
55. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 805, 808 (2000) (“[I]f actors always act rationally in their own self-interest, then, in
the absence of fraud, duress, or the like, all bargains must be fair.”).
56. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993). In that regard, well-advised
shareholders ought to consider the feasibility of buy-sell agreements and long-term
employment agreements to supplement the basic corporate documents.
57. Dalley, supra note 1, at 221 (“Where a controlling stockholder bargains for control,
the courts should not rewrite the contract and provide a windfall to the minority.”); see
Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380 (“It would do violence to normal corporate practice and our
corporation law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-imposed
stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not contracted.”).
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ownership] to the other until the marginal equality condition was
satisfied.”58 But this is true only if shareholders invest across business
forms solely to maximize expected profits. To the extent participation in a
closely held corporation reflects other values—for instance, the desire to
participate with friends and family in a shared venture—then we can no
longer assume that the different business forms will produce similar
financial returns and that their governance problems are equivalent.59
The central problem with the contractarian objection to shareholder
protection is not that it values rationality—we all want to be rational—but
that it ignores the reasons why real-world bargaining among corporate
investors often bears little resemblance to the simplified assumptions of
standard law and economics. The next part uses the insights of behavioral
economics to explain why rational actor theory fails to describe shareholder
relationships in close corporations.
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF IRRATIONAL CHOICE
It is no secret that minority shareholders in close corporations tend not to
bargain for adequate protection, a problem that has been evident for
decades.60 Equally well-understood is that the statutory model of the
corporation was designed with the public corporation in mind.61 Yet the
rational actor theory cannot account for uncorrected flaws in the corporate
model.62 After all, a perfectly rational minority shareholder would always
negotiate for adequate protection, demand a discount commensurate with
the risk of loss through majority opportunism, or decline to invest. Unless
58. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 231.
59. See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority
Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1234 (2009)
(“[P]articipating in a close corporation may represent a fundamental life choice, a
commitment to work together with family or friends to build a business consistent with their
values.”); Susan Clark Muntean, Analyzing the Dearth in Family Enterprise Research, in
DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE RESEARCH IN FAMILY BUSINESS 3, 6 (Phillip H. Phan & John E.
Butler eds., 2008) (“Rational-legal models of the firm typically are silent on the role trust
and altruism flowing from family ties and networks play[s] in decision making and choice of
organizational structure.”).
60. See, e.g., Moll, supra note 30, at 907 (“[C]lose corporation shareholders typically
fail to engage in advance planning and fail to contract for protection from dissension.”);
O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 243 (“Available evidence suggests that relatively few closely held
corporations adopt such contractual devices.”); O’Neal, supra note 21, at 124 (“Important
arrangements among participants in small business enterprises are often oral and sometimes
nothing more than vague understandings, never even definitely stated orally.”).
61. See Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of
Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 265–66 (2008); see also ROBERT CHARLES
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 762 (1986) (“[C]entralization of management . . . has proven most
troublesome in the close corporation context.”). Professor Clark observes that “the standard
model . . . makes good economic sense for public corporations” but works less well for close
corporations as “the shareholders will also expect to be actively engaged in helping to form
and implement the corporation’s business decisions, and they will want to be compensated as
officers or employees.” Id.
62. See Posner, supra note 20, at 865 (“The economic scholarship on contract law
purports to assume that individuals are rational in the sense of neoclassical economics. Their
preferences obey certain consistency requirements, and their cognitive capacity is infinite.”).
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the close corporation form offered an equal return on investment at the
margin, a rational investor would say no.63
This part contends that the rational choice assumptions of standard law
and economics are unhelpful as a way of understanding the predicament of
the minority shareholder or the doctrinal responses that have evolved.64
Behavioral economics offers a more compelling account of minority
shareholders in close corporations. Admittedly, integrating empirical
observation and cognitive psychology complicates the picture of human
behavior and does not lend itself to grand synthesis, but the law should
value accuracy over elegance.
A. Behavioral Economic Evidence
Behavioral economics starts from the premise that “economics [would]
make a lot more sense if it were based on how people actually behave,
instead of how they should behave.”65 By empirically testing assumptions
about rationality, behavioral economists have demonstrated what common
sense had long suggested—people are not as rational as the rational actor
model assumes and depart systematically from its formal requirements.66
Thus, “[o]ur irrational behaviors are neither random nor senseless—they are
systematic and predictable.”67
For example, although it is not economically rational, owners tend to
think their possessions are worth more than non-owners do (the
“endowment effect”) and have a strong aversion to loss.68 In one study,
Duke University students who had entered a lottery for basketball tickets
subsequently assigned a different dollar value to the tickets, depending on
whether they won or lost the lottery, even though the value of the
experience of attending basketball games should have remained the same.69
Experimenters found that “the students who did not own a ticket were
63. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 231 (“Because the world contains so
many different investment vehicles, none will offer distinctively better chances of return
when people can select and shift among them.”).
64. See Posner, supra note 20, at 865 (“If individuals were rational, with no cognitive
limits, and if transaction costs were zero, the role of contract law would be simple and
uninteresting.”).
65. ARIELY, supra note 49, at 239; see also ELSTER, supra note 47, at 67 (“To
understand how people act and interact, we first have to understand how their minds work.”).
66. ARIELY, supra note 49, at 239 (defining behavioral economics as “an emerging field
focused on the (quite intuitive) idea that people do not always behave rationally and that they
often make mistakes in their decisions”); Jon Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633
(1999) (“For the past few decades, cognitive psychologists and behavioral researchers have
been steadily uncovering evidence that human decisionmaking processes are prone to
nonrational, yet systematic, tendencies.”).
67. ARIELY, supra note 49, at 239 (“We all make the same types of mistakes over and
over, because of the basic wiring of our brains. So wouldn’t it make sense to modify
standard economics and move away from naive psychology, which often fails the tests of
reason, introspection, and—most important—empirical scrutiny?”).
68. Id. at 129.
69. Id. at 133 (“From a rational perspective, both the ticket holders and the non-ticket
holders should have thought of the game in exactly the same way.”).
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willing to pay around $170 for one.”70 But “[t]hose who owned a ticket. .
.demanded about $2,400 for it.”71 More than 100 students were contacted;
not one student “was willing to sell a ticket at a price that someone else was
willing to pay.”72
The behavioral economics literature is vast, but the point is simple: we
are not always effective at perceiving and advancing our own self-interest.73
(A moment’s introspection should suffice to confirm the truth of this
statement). If shareholders in close corporations are subject to the same
predictable cognitive biases, then the law and economics objection to
shareholder protection rests upon false assumptions. The objection clings
to a narrow and implausible conception of rational choice, despite empirical
evidence that human decisionmaking departs considerably from the formal
model, in predictable, systematic fashion.74
Behavioral economics has clear implications for our understanding of
close corporation shareholders.75 Although a rational actor would not
overestimate the value of family bonds or fail to give appropriate weight to
all possible future outcomes, close corporation shareholders, as humans, are
susceptible to systematic cognitive errors.
1. Disposition Bias
As shown by the fact that “[n]early ninety percent of drivers believe they
drive better than average,” it is clear “that as a systematic matter, people are
unrealistically optimistic.”76 Perhaps more relevant to the launching of a
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 9 (Penguin Books 2009) (2008) (“The false
assumption is that almost all people, almost all of the time, make choices that are in their
best interest or at the very least are better than the choices that would be made by someone
else. . . . [T]his assumption is false—indeed, obviously false.”).
74. Some law and economics scholars admit that the rational choice model does not
capture actual decisionmaking, that shareholders are only “boundedly rational,” and that
shareholders may even be subject to the predictable biases identified in the behavioral
economics literature. For a discussion, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 23–26. However, it
is not enough to posit that law and economics is akin “to Newtonian physics” and that
corporate rules are simple falling objects for which more sophisticated models are
unnecessary. Id. at 26. The concession that people are not rational in the formal economic
sense leaves no adequate explanatory mechanism. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 26
(contending that rational choice theorists cannot rely on the analogy to “Newton’s theory”
because “[t]here is no general nonintentional mechanism that can simulate or mimic
rationality”) (emphasis omitted). Professor Bainbridge may nevertheless be right that
standard “economics adequately explains the behavior of large masses of people engaged in
exchange.” BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 26. Perhaps market forces supply the mechanism
in those circumstances. Cf. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 26 (acknowledging possibility that
“[s]ome kind of social analog to natural selection” might substitute for rationality “at least
roughly”). As discussed infra Part III.C, however, markets do not correct for irrational
choice in close corporations.
75. See Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1465 (“[P]roblems of systematic error apply with
special force to bargains concerning closely held corporations.”).
76. Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 216.
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business venture are surveys of individuals who are about to get married,
showing that while “respondents correctly estimated that fifty percent of
American couples will eventually divorce” they “estimated that their own
chance of divorce was zero.”77
Thus, disposition bias may cause investors to overvalue the likely success
of a venture and to underestimate the risk of conflict.78 Even if potential
investors understood, as a general matter, that business ventures fail and
that family relationships falter, they might not apply that insight to their
own situation. Moreover, although a rational actor would gather the
optimal amount of information before making a final decision, optimism
may cause investors to look for information that reinforces their existing
belief.79
2. Cognitive Bounds
Shareholders may also fail to protect themselves against the possibility of
oppression because they cannot process information perfectly, as the
rational choice model requires. This discrepancy between the ideal and the
actual is sometimes called “bounded rationality.”80 For example, minority
shareholders may “give too little weight to future benefits and costs as
compared to present benefits and costs.”81 Similarly, shareholders may
misjudge the risk of low-probability, unpleasant outcomes.82 Even when

77. See id. at 217 (citing Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship
Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993)).
78. See id. (“[W]hen people rate their chances for personal and professional success,
most unrealistically believe that their chances are better than average.”); Sean Hannon
Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage,
Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 733 (2009)
(“Most people underestimate the likelihood that they will experience negative events and
overestimate the likelihood that the law will protect them if those events occur.”).
79. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 158 (“The agent initially forms an emotion-induced
bias, and the urgency of emotion then prevents her from gathering the information that might
have corrected the bias.”).
80. See William J. Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs,
Control Premiums and Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 59–60 (1987) (“Investors in
closely held enterprises are likely to be subject to conditions of bounded rationality, under
which they either fail to perceive the complete set of problems that may occur later, or
underestimate the probability of their occurrence.”); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King,
Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 17 (2009) (defining “bounded rationality”
as “a somewhat malleable term that includes an inability to negotiate future plans because
parties ‘have to find a common language to describe states of the world and actions with
respect to which prior experience may not provide much of a guide.’” (citation omitted)).
81. Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 222 (contending that, as a consequence of their “faulty
telescopic faculty” people systematically misjudge their future preferences) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also ELSTER, supra note 47, at 224 (defining the “inability to
project” as “the lack of ability to imagine what oneself or others would have reasons to
believe, or incentives to do, in future situations that depend one’s present choice”).
82. See Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 223 (“Related to actors’ faulty telescopic faculties is
the systematic underestimation of risks.”). Professor Eisenberg cites “empirical evidence . . .
that people often not only underestimate but ignore low-probability risks.” Id. On the other
hand, people may dramatically overestimate unlikely events that are “available” (like
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they modify default rules, shareholders may do so in ways that fail
rationally to advance their own interests.
For example, in Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.,83 two
brothers (and their respective families) had equal control over the profitable
Demoulas supermarket chain.84 When one of the brothers died, the
surviving brother assumed full control of the business.85 He later used that
power to squeeze out his brother’s family, reserving most of the benefits of
ownership for himself.86 It apparently had not occurred to the brothers to
take steps to prevent the surviving brother from misappropriating the value
of the business.87 Quite the opposite, they had entered into a voting trust
agreement that gave unchecked authority to the surviving brother, expecting
that each would take care of the family of the predeceased.88
The implications of behavioral economics research for law remain
unsettled,89 but for our purposes, it suffices that shareholders in close
corporations are unlikely to behave like homo economicus. Unless we take
the brute force view that “eventually they’ll learn,” a contract theory based
on a false description of human behavior is just not terribly useful.90
B. Contesting the Implications of Irrational Choice
Law and economics scholars may respond to the findings of behavioral
economics by contending that markets and lawyers will correct for any
serious departures from rational choice on the part of individual investors,
that behavioral economics lacks theoretical coherence and offers no clear
lessons, and that, even assuming human beings do not always measure up to
an economist’s vision of rationality, corporate law should remain oriented

terrorism) while paying insufficient attention to more likely but less salient risks—like flu
and dehydration. See id. at 223–24.
83. 677 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. 1997).
84. Id. at 165. The business was established by their parents as “a neighborhood food
store” in 1917. Id.
85. Id. at 165–66 (describing operation of voting trust agreement that vested sole voting
power in the hands of the surviving brother).
86. Id. at 166.
87. This may also be an example of “disposition bias.”
88. Through the voting trust agreement, the parties not only failed to consider the
possibility of oppression, but actually sought to eliminate legal protections they otherwise
would have enjoyed. Id. at 171 (describing restrictions on shareholder litigation built into the
trust agreement). Of course, trust agreements impose specific fiduciary responsibilities;
arguably, the parties bolstered their fiduciary obligations contractually, using trust law to
supplant corporate law protections. Although permitting the plaintiffs to sue for breach of
the trust agreement may have best honored the terms of the contract, the court found the
shareholder litigation restriction void as against public policy. Id. at 172.
89. See generally Arlen, supra note 48.
90. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 810–11 (“[E]xpected-utility (rational-actor) theory
‘emerged from a logical analysis of games of chance rather than from a psychological
analysis of risk and value. The theory was conceived as a normative model of an idealized
decision maker, not as a description of the behavior of real people.’” (quoting Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, at
S251 (Supp. 1986)).
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toward rational behavior. These objections, however, are speculative and
undermined by the available evidence.
Although markets are sometimes offered as a corrective for individual
cognitive errors, they seem unlikely to play that role in a close corporation:
Any plausible theory of effective market discipline in corporate law
generally rests on some combination of the following: an efficient capital
marketplace that prices both good and bad corporate governance with
reasonable precision; compensation of key insiders using stock or options,
so as to better align the interests of managers and investors; the emerging
power of institutional investors who can actually threaten to exercise their
voting rights; and a reasonably active market for corporate control.91

Unlike a public corporation, where the stock price will, in theory, impound
all available information, even though individual investors may lack the
information or the ability to process it, close corporation stock does not
trade actively.92 Because the market is illiquid, there is no established
market price for close corporation stock and no market for corporate
control.93 Other markets may be useful—for instance, the employment
market that indicates the salary a shareholder could command by working
for a different business—yet those markers provide only rough guidance
and have little bearing on the problem of oppression.94 Also, close
corporation shareholders often have investment goals that are more
complex than simple profit maximization.95
Alternatively, because business investment decisions are not often made
lightly and may involve the assistance of counsel, we might insist upon
rational behavior from participants in a business venture, even though we

91. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual
Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty,
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1031 (2005).
92. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered
Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 759 (2000) (“By definition . . . there is no
ready market for the stock of a close corporation.”).
93. Although the divergence of interest of managers and investors is less serious in close
corporations, because investors typically run the corporation directly, that alignment of
interest does not reduce the incentive of controlling shareholders to take a disproportionate
share of corporate profits. See Michael Carney, Corporate Governance and Competitive
Advantage in Family-Controlled Firms, 29 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 249, 250
(2005).
94. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 233 (“There can be no presumption
that those who have invested equal amounts are entitled to equal salaries as managers.”).
95. See, e.g., Bill Vlasic, Family Loyalty Anchors Ford in Risky Times, N.Y. TIMES, June
23, 2009, at A1.
Ford is still losing money—$1.4 billion in the first quarter alone—and its cash
reserves are shrinking as auto sales have dried up for the entire industry. Even so,
Ford family members said they could not envision any situation that would cause
them to sell out.
“If this were just a financial investment, the family probably would have been
out of it years ago,” Bill Ford said. “This is very much an emotional
commitment.” Although Ford Motor Company is publicly traded, the descendents
of its founder, Henry Ford, are the controlling shareholders.
Id.
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would make allowances for human frailty elsewhere.96 However, “many
close corporation participants are ill-advised or unsophisticated and so may
not anticipate” dissension.97 Lawyers may not be involved or, because of
cost concerns, have only a peripheral role.98 Further, even excellent
lawyers cannot anticipate all future events, and the fundamental tension
between preserving flexibility and constraining opportunism will remain.
For some law and economics scholars, the questionable choice to put all
one’s eggs in a single basket must nevertheless be consistent with rational
choice.99 The argument is tautological because it assumes what is at issue:
whether a concentrated investment decision will be made carefully. Indeed,
if anything, the decision to tie up a substantial percentage of one’s wealth in
a close corporation may itself be evidence of a departure from economic
rationality.100 Even though some shareholders are quite sophisticated—
venture capital firms, for instance, approximate the rational-actor model
when making investment decisions and bargain for control rights in
exquisite detail—the law’s basic structure should protect unsophisticated
investors who are unlikely to protect themselves.101 Indeed, the ranks of
the relatively unsophisticated often include business entrepreneurs who
seek venture-capital financing.102
96. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 237 (“The attorney is a specialist
provider of information; questions that never occur to the parties have been addressed and
solved long ago by others, and attorneys transmit this accumulated expertise.”).
97. Charny, supra note 8, at 1872.
98. See O’Neal, supra note 21, at 124 (“[E]ven if the participants foresee the possibility
of future dissension, they are reluctant to call in and pay the costs of legal counsel to provide
against contingencies.”). Not all lawyers have the requisite expertise to help close
corporation shareholders negotiate appropriate, tailored provisions. See Judd F. Sneirson,
Soft Paternalism for Close Corporations: Helping Shareholders Help Themselves, 2008
WIS. L. REV. 899, 916 n.92 (“[S]ome attorneys who do not specialize in business planning
may not appreciate the need for [minority shareholder] protections or be able to
professionally draft them.”). A lawyer who advises all participants may fail to protect the
interests of each participant. Moreover, as sales of self-incorporation books indicate, many
corporations are formed without legal advice. See id. at 916–17.
99. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 237 (“Investors in close corporations
often put a great deal of their wealth at stake, and the lack of diversification (compared with
investors in publicly held firms) induces them to take care.”).
100. See Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held
Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1109 (1999) (“Holding stock in a closely held
corporation, viewed purely as an investment decision, seems almost irrational from an
economic perspective.”).
101. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989) (“[I]f the majority is more
likely to contract around the minority’s preferred default rule (than the minority is to contract
around the majority’s rule), then choosing the minority’s default may lead to a larger set of
efficient contracts.”). Admittedly, the choice of more protective default rules “involves
imposing costs of drafting opt-out agreements on some transactors to protect other
transactors who would not have the sophistication or good judgment to insist by contract on
the protections that they automatically receive under a more protective regime.” Charny,
supra note 8, at 1872. However, venture capital firms can reuse previously drafted
agreements, thereby reducing the cost.
102. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 975 (2006) (“[W]e doubt that many entrepreneurs are well
advised and fully informed when contracting with VCs . . . .”); Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal
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Nor does it follow that bargained-for protections indicate, by negative
implication, that other protections must not have been considered
valuable.103 Even when the parties do negotiate, certain issues will be
easier to anticipate and address, and their relative simplicity bears no
obvious relation to their importance. For instance, in many cases “[v]oice
matters to minority shareholders not only as a procedural protection, but
often as, in itself, a central benefit of the investment.”104 Yet the closest
analogue—a long-term employment agreement—does not fully capture the
minority’s interest in having a voice in the business and raises other
problems for the controlling shareholders. As one commentator observes,
“[I]nvestors in a near-the-margin closely held corporation would be
unlikely to grant minority investors a contractually fixed right to continued
employment and to a predetermined share of profits.”105 By contrast,
restraints on share alienability designed to limit ownership to agreed
members may not be considered critical, yet such restraints are relatively
simple to conceive and implement.
Even conceding that irrationality impacts decisionmaking and is not
reliably cured by other market forces or by lawyers, some may object that a
list of departures from rationality falls short of a theory of behavior.106 It
takes a theory to beat a theory.107 But behavioral economics demonstrates
that cognitive errors are systematic, not random, and bases its observations
on a theory of mind. Whether behavioral economics counts as an

Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed
Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 100 (“[T]he manner by which an entrepreneur collects and
interprets facts about the contractual context, as well as the way that she uses these facts to
construct her beliefs and plans, will be affected in significant ways by the tendency of
entrepreneurs to be over-optimistic.”).
103. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 238 (rejecting “ignorance”
explanation for exclusion of shareholder protections by reference to commonly-included
provisions such as “restraints on alienation” of shares).
104. Means, supra note 59, at 1213.
105. O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 244. The problem with such guarantees is that they
“undermine the adaptability of the team and create a risk of minority opportunism in the
form of shirking, two problems that efficiency-minded joint owners . . . seek to avoid by
choosing corporate form instead of partnership form.” Id.
106. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 7 (“In itself, irrationality is just a negative or residual
idea, everything that is not rational. For the idea to have any explanatory purchase, we need
to appeal to specific forms of irrationality with specific implications for behavior.”); Arlen,
supra note 48, at 1768 (“[E]ven when people are not rational, behavioral analysis of law
cannot necessarily provide an alternative framework for developing normative policy
prescriptions because it does not yet have a coherent, robust, tractable model of human
behavior which can serve as a basis for such recommendations.”); Adam Benforado & Jon
Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal Theorists to Situationist Insights,
57 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1119 (2008) (“As soon as behavioralism began to gain some traction,
many conventional legal economists denigrated the new approach for lacking a single,
simple theory that could generate at-the-ready testable behavioral predictions.”).
107. See Posner, supra note 20, at 867 (“[One reason that] [e]conomists reject bounded
rationality arguments . . . is methodological:
They cannot agree on a standard,
mathematically tractable formulation of bounded rationality.”). As Posner comments, “This
might be a good reason for economists, but it is a bad reason for lawyers.” Id.
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independent theory because it builds upon and does not wholly reject
traditional economic analysis, the evidence cannot simply be ignored.108
The objection that behavioral economics is too ad hoc to count as theory
is further undermined by the tendency of standard law and economics to
treat its own assumptions as non-falsifiable.109
For instance, one
commentator dismisses the problem that people fail to plan for their future
needs and instead over-indulge current consumption preferences
(“hyperbolic discounting”) by postulating that human identity over time is
not continuous.110 The present “self” choosing is not the same as the future
“self” experiencing the consequences; the present “self” may rationally
ignore the interests of that future person, who is a stranger, remote in time
and space.111 Although the “‘multiple selves’ approach” is convenient (and
could even be true), its after-the-fact interpolation diminishes the integrity
of rational-choice theory and its pretension to scientific explanation.112
Moreover, if this is what rational choice means, why would we defer to it?
To the extent people cannot order their affairs into the future, a society that
intends to preserve itself over time must make up for that deficiency.113
However, a skeptic might also observe that behavioral economics
sometimes fails to generate clear predictions.114 If there are multiple
cognitive biases, and if those biases sometimes point in different directions,
then who can say what role any particular bias may have on behavior?115
Thus, behavioral economics cannot generate determinate answers to most
questions. But we do not need to separate each causal factor to understand
108. See William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual
Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 185 (1992) (“The assertion ‘it takes a theory to beat a
theory’ is not strictly correct. A theory indeed may beat a theory. Nothing, however, beats a
theory like a practice, and reference to practice makes the pure contractual corporation
untenable.”).
109. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 52, at 1558–59 (asserting superior predictive power of
simpler rational-choice model); id. at 1560 (“If a theory cannot be falsified, neither it nor its
predictions can be validated . . . .”).
110. See id. at 1555 (“All the selves are rational but they have inconsistent preferences.”).
111. See id.
112. This problem also arises when rational choice theorists contend that any supposedly
unselfish motivation for choice can be redescribed in terms of the personal utility gained by
acting charitably or out of a sense of moral duty. See SEN, supra note 18, at 28 (critiquing
“complex instrumentality” arguments). It may be true that other-directed conduct serves
hedonistic goals, but the assertion that it must do so is impossible to falsify and gives
rational choice the ability to swallow any motive.
113. For an interesting argument that contractual commitments extend human identity
over time, see JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT (2001).
114. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1487 (1998) (“A possible objection to our approach is that conventional
economics has the advantage of simplicity and parsimony. At least—the objection goes—it
provides a theory.”). As the authors concede, “a behavioral perspective offers a more
complicated and unruly picture of human behavior, and perhaps that picture will make
prediction more difficult, precisely because behavior is more complicated and unruly.” Id.
115. See Arlen, supra note 48, at 1768; see also ELSTER, supra note 47, at 46 (“In
general, the social sciences are not very good at explaining how causes interact to produce a
joint effect.”). Thus, “[t]he existence of an interaction effect may be subject to the same
kind of indeterminacy that we find in mechanisms more generally.” Id. at 47.
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that, collectively, they push shareholders away from the negotiation that the
rational choice model predicts. The multiplicity of causation counsels
modesty in our efforts to explain human behavior and only reinforces the
need to move past the stylized, rational choice model.116
Still another version of the objection to behavioral economics might
argue that if irrationality is part of being human, courts will be as prone to
error as shareholders.117 Cognitive errors, however, depend on the actor’s
situation, and a court will not be subject to the emotional attachments and
over-optimism that may lead to a sub-optimal amount of bargaining in close
corporations.118 To the contrary, we might worry that judges will succumb
to “hindsight bias,” treating an event as highly probable or inevitable
simply because it actually happened.119 If the eventual dispute appears to
have been inevitable, then a court may conclude that the minority
shareholder ought to have anticipated it. In any event, it is not enough to
claim that judges are imperfect—law and economics scholars must offer
some reason to prefer non-ideal contracting to non-ideal judging, a burden
they have not met.
Nor does it derail the argument to acknowledge that majority
shareholders, who have more invested and more to lose, are also subject to
cognitive limitations.120 The point is not that a cunning majority dupes a
guileless minority into investing without adequate protection—although
information disparities and disparate power may sometimes produce that
result. Rather, shareholder oppression is a problem because the majority
may later be tempted to act opportunistically or, in the event of family or
corporate dissension, may wish to punish the minority. When informal,
cooperative dynamics falter, corporate law gives the majority the ability to
get its way without the need for any substantial minority input, let alone
support.
Finally, there is the normative case for rational choice. Despite our many
failings, we “want to be rational” and “do not take pride in our lapses from
rationality.”121 The behavioral economic critique demonstrates the flaws of
rational choice as a predictive theory but “does not, in itself, provide
116. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 5, at 191 (“It is the economists who resist seeing
or taking seriously what others are revealing, through the scientific method, about what
moves us. And they are doing so based on a theory that has been falsified (or is nonfalsifiable) and, which, therefore, is based, at bottom, on an evidence-blind intuition or
faith.”).
117. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 2, at 391 (noting that in some situations “[i]t may be
easier to anticipate, and therefore incorporate into price or otherwise bargain around, the
selfish conduct of fiduciaries than to anticipate the conduct of judges and the monitoring and
error costs associated with judicial decisions”).
118. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1622 (“From its ex post perspective, a court can more
easily determine if opportunistic advantage has been taken of the minority.”).
119. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).
120. There may well be circumstances where enforcement of the literal terms of an
agreement—for instance, opportunistic use by the minority of a buy-sell provision—produce
inequitable results for majority shareholders.
121. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 164.
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grounds for questioning the formulation of rationality.”122 However, a
more capacious definition of rationality is possible; rather than reduce
rationality to the maximization of self-interest, we might, for example,
characterize it as the “discipline of subjecting one’s choices—of actions as
well as objectives, values and priorities—to reasoned scrutiny.”123 This
definition could include within the ambit of rationality socially motivated
reasons for choice and choices dictated by a sense of moral duty.124 In the
close corporation context, those additional considerations might involve a
sense of family obligation, honesty, and fairness.125
C. The Limits of Institutional Design
An advantage of the behavioral economic perspective is that it
encourages creative solutions to enable human beings to act in accordance
with their own self-interest and to overcome their cognitive limitations.126
For example, recognizing that “[a]ctors systematically give too little weight
to future benefits and costs as compared to present benefits and costs,”127
122. SEN, supra note 18, at 29.
123. Id. at 4; see also Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Rational Actor Theory, Social
Norms, and Policy Implementation: Applications to Administrative Processes and
Bureaucratic Culture, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO POLITICS 237, 237 (Kristen Renwick
Monroe ed., 1991) (“The principal alternative [to rational actor theory], the communitarian
approach, argues that behavior is driven primarily by commonly shared values . . . which are
internal to a society and which have value and meaning . . . within the social context in
which behavior takes place.”). Although socially motivated reasons for choice might be
described in self-interested terms—for instance, the self-satisfaction one feels after a
charitable donation—choice cannot be reduced to those terms without serious loss of
meaning. SEN, supra note 18, at 26 (“[T]he point is that these broader values are not ruled
out on the ground that they lack reason and would be irrational to entertain (unless justified
by some underlying complex instrumental connection that makes them selfishly
beneficial).”).
124. See SEN, supra note 18, at 28 (contending that rational choice theory “has denied
room for some important motivations and certain reasons for choice, including some
concerns that Adam Smith had seen as parts of standard ‘moral sentiments’ and Immanuel
Kant had included among the demands of rationality in social living (in the form of
‘categorical imperatives’).”); see also ELSTER, supra note 47, at 227 (“Acting on the
categorical imperative is . . . irrational. Rationality tells me to choose as a function of what
will happen if I do A rather than B.”). Consequently, to be rational, choices “have to be
reinterpreted . . . within the format of intelligent pursuit of self-interest” and “[t]his has given
the explanatory role of [rational choice theory] an almost forensic quality, focusing on the
detection of hidden instrumentality . . . .” SEN, supra, at 28. Professor Sen concludes
caustically: “[t]hings, it is darkly hinted, are not what they seem (or at least seemed to
simple-minded observers like Smith or Kant).” Id. at 29.
125. I do not mean to suggest that courts should enforce altruistic behavior under the
guise of rationality, only that the meaning of rationality need not be artificially constricted so
that anything that does not maximize an individual’s self-interest cannot count as rational.
The normative desirability of reason should not weigh for or against protection of minority
shareholders.
126. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 232 (“If we understand our propensity to make
mistakes, we can and do take precautions to make us less likely to make them again, or at
least limit the damage if we do.”); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 73, at 11–13 (describing
goal of choice architecture: “Choosers are human, so designers should make life as easy as
possible.”).
127. Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 222.
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we might automatically enroll employees in a retirement savings plan while
allowing them to opt out.128 Employees would remain free to decide
according to their own preferences, but would receive a “nudge” in what
(for the vast majority of people) is the right direction. Because such
proposals second-guess individuals’ own choices while leaving them free to
make the final decision, Professors Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler use
the label “libertarian-paternalism” to acknowledge the seeming
contradiction.129 Recently, some scholars have applied these insights to
close corporation law.130
However, solving the problem of shareholder oppression requires more
than a “nudge” for three principal reasons. First, unless there is a clear right
answer, we cannot choose helpful default settings. Unlike the obvious and
near-universal benefits of tax-deferred savings plans, a rational investment
in a close corporation will depend upon the specific circumstances. For
instance, some minority shareholders might benefit from mandatory
distribution of profits as dividends in order to prevent freeze outs, while
others—if they contemplated working for the business—might prefer to
negotiate long-term employment contracts with specified salaries.131 The
two strategies could be combined; alternatively, a rational shareholder
might prefer to leave corporate managers with maximum flexibility. Since
multiple approaches are appropriate in different contexts, what would we
“nudge” people to do?132
Second, even if we concluded that certain default rules would benefit
minority shareholders, we would have to measure that benefit against
potential costs. For instance, a rule requiring the distribution of dividends
128. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 73, at 12.
129. See id., at 4–5.
130. See, e.g., Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (Or at Least Understand Why
You Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce
Oppression in Closely Held Businesses?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 496 (2009)
(contending “that statutes governing both corporations and LLCs should require all owners
to read several warnings about the dangers of a lack of advance planning before starting a
business . . . [and] that ‘form’ agreements and provisions protecting minority interests should
be widely available, either as freely available standard ‘template’ agreements or . . . default
provisions in statutes”); Sneirson, supra note 98, at 901–02 (“By redesigning state
incorporation forms to so ‘nudge’ parties to protect themselves against later minorityshareholder oppression . . . secretaries of state and others can . . . encourage those likely to
need such protection to elect it, while allowing more sophisticated incorporators to easily
and cheaply opt out.”).
131. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E. 2d 657, 662 (Mass.
1976) (“A guaranty of employment with the corporation may have been one of the ‘basic
reason[s] why a minority owner has invested capital in the firm.’” (quoting Symposium, The
Close Corporation, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 345, 392 (1957))).
132. Professor Sneirson suggests that do-it-yourself manuals should also advise
incorporators to enter “shareholder agreements that guarantee the original investors seats on
the company’s board, employment with the company, and dividends (perhaps according to a
formula).” Sneirson, supra note 98, at 928. He is right to counsel that self-help books on
incorporation should include discussion of shareholder oppression issues, but it is unclear
whether his specific recommendations would improve corporate governance in most close
corporations. Mandatory board and employment rules limit a corporation’s flexibility, and
dividend requirements limit the ability to commit substantial resources to the business and
create a risk of shirking. There are tradeoffs involved, and the optimal mix will vary.
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could later hamstring the corporation’s ability to reinvest funds, or, in
adverse business environments, to retain extra operating capital.133
Additionally, even if advantageous in the abstract, a default rule might need
too much tailoring to accomplish its purpose. For instance, if we reasoned
that in a world without transaction costs most rational investors would
bargain for a right to sell their stock, we might decide to create a default
right of exit.134 However, one-size-fits-all exit provisions135 may only
encourage opportunism. If the accompanying valuation mechanism is set
too low, it creates an incentive for controlling shareholders to freeze out
minority shareholders and force a buy out.136 If the valuation is too high or
the method of valuation is itself particularly burdensome, the right of exit
could encourage minority shareholder opportunism.137
Third, it might be objected that even useful default settings cannot
substitute for mandatory rules, and that the Sunstein and Thaler model
could undermine existing shareholder protections.138
For instance,
Professor Judd Sneirson uses the model to propose heightened duties owed
among shareholders as a default setting, leaving the parties free to reject
Although the argument presumes that
those responsibilities.139

133. Of course, such issues can be addressed through detailed negotiation and, for some
corporations, the benefits of mandatory distribution will outweigh the costs. See, e.g., Galler
v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964) (enforcing shareholder agreement that conditioned
payment of annual dividends, inter alia, on maintenance of $500,000 surplus). The point is
that, when any number of policies are equally plausible and highly context dependent, it will
be difficult for a benevolent lawmaker, armed with the latest behavioral economic research,
to establish a useful default setting.
134. See, e.g., Dalley, supra note 1, at 198 (observing without endorsement that “the law
might contain default rules similar to those selected by sophisticated investors”); Matheson
& Maler, supra note 4, at 691.
135. See Means, supra note 59, at 1252–54.
136. For example, in Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), three
brothers were shareholders in a close corporation and entered into a stock retirement
agreement (SRA) intended to guide the purchase of one shareholder’s stock by the others if
that shareholder wanted to leave the business or else upon his death. The SRA valued each
share of stock at only “75% of net book value at the end of the preceding calendar year,” id.
at 800, and this low valuation may have motivated two of the brothers to fire the third. See
id. The purchase price dictated by the SRA was $563,417.67 lower than the fair market
value later awarded by the court after finding that the two brothers had acted oppressively.
Id. at 802.
137. See O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 226 (noting that a strong exit right “exposes team
members to the risk of loss from opportunistic threats to withdraw”).
138. Under existing law, parties may “bargain over structural and distributional rules,”
but they cannot waive fiduciary duties. See Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1469.
139. Sneirson contends that “[w]ith a few simple changes, states’ (typically) one-page
incorporation forms can be made to encourage protection for those minority shareholders
most likely to need it without imposing on those shareholders and businesses most likely not
to need it.” Sneirson, supra note 98, at 901. Incorporators would have to “opt out if they do
not want to owe one another heightened . . . fiduciary duties.” Id. at 919–20. For a related
argument that courts should enforce fiduciary norms as default terms, see Charny, supra note
8, at 1872:
Occasions for opportunistic distribution of gains from the enterprise arise in an
enormous array of situations that may be difficult to anticipate via contract terms.
Given the complexity of the requisite provisions, it would seem to be substantially
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shareholders systematically depart from rational choice—which is why they
need a “nudge”—it does not explain how the default rule would reduce the
likelihood of cognitive error.140 Unless some level of protection is
mandatory, trusting and optimistic shareholders may be induced to abandon
it at the outset of the venture.141 On the other hand, courts routinely enforce
unwise contractual bargains, and an explicit decision to waive certain
protections is not an oversight; it is a specific choice.142
In sum, we can perhaps ameliorate—but cannot hope to solve—the
problem of shareholder oppression by changing default rules. The next part
further establishes the need for a strong judicial monitoring role to remedy
shareholder oppression by explaining why, even if shareholders were
entirely rational in a formal, economic sense, it would be unrealistic to
expect them to bargain in advance for protection against all variants of
opportunism.
III. ACCOUNTING FOR INCOMPLETE BARGAINS AND SOCIAL NORMS
The contractarian objection to shareholder oppression doctrine posits that
rational shareholders bargain for necessary protections before investing in a
cheaper to imply a strong set of background duties and permit individual
transactors to draft opt out provisions.
140. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1469 (“[B]argains to relax materially the fiduciary
rules set by law would likely be systematically underinformed even over the short term.”).
Thus, “[a]ny such waiver would therefore inevitably permit unanticipated opportunistic
behavior.” Id. at 1470.
141. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 572 (1990) (“[G]iving close corporations the power to
dispense with the duty of loyalty would be troublesome.”). Although Professor Black favors
enabling rules that parties can modify, he acknowledges that “[t]he casebooks are full of
situations where . . . trust proved to be misplaced” in close corporations. Id. Consequently,
“a fully enabling regime may be inefficient.” Id. at 573. Absent mandatory protection, the
“instances of abuse will likely increase.” Id. at 572. Similarly, Professor Coffee contends
that some fiduciary norms should be mandatory and that any permitted “departures from the
default rules of fiduciary duty must be sufficiently specific and bounded to permit the
departure to be accurately priced.” Coffee, supra note 7, at 1624.
142. Courts, of course, may demand clear evidence that a choice to waive fiduciary
protection has been made. Recent Delaware case law suggests that courts will not lightly
find a waiver. Under Delaware’s LLC law, as amended in 2004, LLC members may choose
to eliminate all fiduciary duties. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (2005). For such a waiver
to be enforceable, however, the Delaware courts have required that it be unmistakably clear.
See, e.g., Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, No. 3658, 2009 WL
1124451, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (“[T]he interpretive scales also tip in favor of
preserving fiduciary duties under the rule that the drafters of chartering documents must
make their intent to eliminate fiduciary duties plain and unambiguous.”) (citations omitted).
To the extent that honoring the parties’ decision to waive fiduciary duties leads to wealthreducing outcomes, then autonomy and welfare conflict, and law and economics scholars
have to justify why we should care about rational choice. However, as discussed infra Part
V, this Article contends that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every
contract gives courts a powerful tool for addressing shareholder oppression disputes
consistent with a robust view of private ordering. In addition, courts can reject bargains that
are unconscionable. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine,
and Accomodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 221–23 (2000) (arguing that the doctrine of
unconscionability does not require paternalism, because the enforcement of contracts
involves community standards that are not within the power of the parties to alter).
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close corporation.143 Yet, even if we made the heroic assumption that
shareholders are rational actors and immune to cognitive biases, transaction
costs would prevent complete bargaining.144 Therefore, according to law
and economics scholars, investors save time and money by selecting the
form of business organization that supplies the most suitable general terms.
Those terms then become part of the contractual bargain,145 while
unsuitable ones are jettisoned or modified.146 In a shareholder dispute,
then, courts should treat the background rules of corporate law as part of the
parties’ agreement.147 If courts must supplement the bargain, they should
aim to supply for the parties what they “would have bargained for had they
anticipated the problems and been able to transact costlessly in advance.”148
This part contends that the standard law and economics response to
incomplete bargaining is inadequate, because it attaches too little
importance to courts as gap-filling mechanisms. First, background
corporate law rules govern all types of corporations and may be unsuitable
for close corporations.149 Also, a business form may be selected for tax
planning purposes or other reasons unrelated to governance.150 Because
transaction costs apply to the modification of default rules as well as to
drafting contracts ab initio, we cannot simply assume that the parties will be
able to afford the cost of bargaining around problematic default rules.
Second, because corporate governance rules allocate the right to make
future decisions to the board of directors, which is elected by a majority of
143. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 392 (“A close corporation provides more direct
opportunity for specific private ordering because there exists no large-numbers problem that
can lead to free rider questions or rational apathy.”).
144. See, e.g., Charny, supra note 8, at 1819 (“In almost all transactions, it would be
extremely costly to draft a contract that purported explicitly to address the obligations of the
parties for all conceivable future contingencies.”); Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, at 1090
(same); Posner, supra note 20, at 833 (“A theoretically complete contract would describe all
the possible contingencies, but transaction costs—including the cost of negotiating and
writing down the terms—and foreseeing low-probability events, render all contracts
incomplete.”).
145. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183 (2004).
146. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, at 1090 (“If the basic risk allocation provided by a
legal rule fails to suit the purposes of particular parties, then bargainers are free to negotiate
an alternative allocation of risks.”).
147. See O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 216 (“If consensus is not possible, then the close
corporation contract’s gap-filling processes will come into play.”). O’Kelley states that
“[t]he close corporation contract assigns primary gap-filling authority to majority
shareholders . . . .” Id. This authority includes the ability to “discharge a minority
shareholder from the corporation’s employ” as well as “policies concerning payment of
dividends, redemption of shares, or compensation of shareholder-employees.” Id. at 216 n.2.
The contract leaves only “secondary, discretionary gap-filling authority to courts.” Id. at 216.
148. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 34.
149. See, e.g., DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, THE LAW OF CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS 1-1 (2009) (“[S]hareholders in closely held corporations often expect to run
their businesses in ways that differ dramatically from traditional corporation norms—norms
that are generally designed to serve the needs of publicly held corporations.”).
150. LLCs are an increasingly popular choice of form because firms can readily “adopt
corporate-type terms such as free transferability, perpetual life, and centralized management
without subjecting themselves to the corporate double tax . . . .” RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at
131.
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the shares eligible to vote, even a matter entirely outside the contemplation
of the parties at the time of investment would not fall into a contractual gap.
This adaptive capacity is a virtue of corporate law but seems to leave little
room for courts to protect minority shareholders from oppression at the
hands of the majority. If courts adopted the narrow view of their role that
law and economics scholars advocate, rational parties would be forced to
mistrust corporate law’s sensible, if rough, control rules and add layers of
costly negotiation.151
Third, trust and social bonds are hallmarks of the closely held business,
and rational shareholders may choose not to bargain at arm’s length when
doing so could endanger the social norms that drive the business.152
Judicial monitoring, in short, deserves to be a primary—not merely
secondary—response to the problem of transaction costs.
A. Transaction Costs and Gap Filling
Corporations have an unlimited lifespan, and shareholders cannot
practicably bargain for a fully specified, long-term contract.153 Thus,
economically rational investors will often prefer to live with an incomplete
bargain, addressing problems later, if and when they arise.154 To the extent
the parties rationally choose to leave some questions unanswered, however,
the gap-filling mechanisms they select (or that the law supplies) become an
important part of their agreement.155

151. See Charny, supra note 8, at 1820 (“Correlatively, once the parties know that the law
will supply the term, they take that into account when calculating the benefits of drafting an
express term. Parties will not incur the costs of specifying the term if they suspect that
courts will supply the appropriate term in any event.”); Coffee, supra note 7, at 1621 (“In
drafting the corporate contract, lawyers rely less on the model form provided by legislature
than on their expectation that courts will prevent either side from taking ‘opportunistic’
advantage of the other.”).
152. See ARIELY, supra note 49, at 78–83 (observing that some businesses have sought to
foster social, rather than purely market relationships with their employees and, even, with
their customers). Ariely contends that “[i]f corporations started thinking in terms of social
norms, they would realize that these norms build loyalty and—more important—make
people want to extend themselves to the degree that corporations need today: to be flexible,
concerned, and willing to pitch in.” Id. at 83. As Ariely concludes, “That’s what a social
relationship delivers.” Id. Whether it is rational for close corporation shareholders to rely on
social norms instead of arm’s-length negotiation depends in part on whether courts can be
expected to take an active role in monitoring disputes.
153. See BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 26, at 36 (“[M]ost long-term contracts in
practice are incomplete, in that they do not deal explicitly with all possible contingencies and
leave many decisions . . . to be determined later.”) (emphasis omitted).
154. See O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 216 (“Viewed contractually, the typical closely held
corporation is mostly gaps.”); see generally Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete
Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988).
155. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE LAW 12, 13 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993) (“Although it is instructive and a great
analytical convenience to assume that agents have the capacity to engage in comprehensive
ex ante contracting . . . the condition of bounded rationality precludes this.”). Consequently,
“[t]he study of structures that facilitate gap filling, dispute resolution, adaptation, and the
like . . . become part of the problem of economic organization.” Id.
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According to law and economics scholars, rational investors meet the
problem of incomplete bargaining first and foremost by adopting the form
of business organization that best suits their needs.156 There are, after all,
partnerships, limited partnerships, corporations, and LLCs, each with
different governance rules.157 Distinct business forms reduce transaction
costs by providing sets of coherent principles against which any further
explicit bargaining can take place.158 In particular, different forms of
business organization allocate the right to make decisions in the future.159
By incorporating, investors give majority shareholders substantially
unfettered discretion to decide questions that have not been negotiated ex
ante.160 Finally, and solely as a residual matter, law and economics
scholars contend that the role of efficiency-minded courts is to supply the
contract terms that economically rational parties would have chosen under
conditions of frictionless bargaining.161
Unfortunately, choice-of-form analysis does not solve the problem of
incomplete bargaining. Unless we assume that a perfect choice exists for
each prospective business, the most we can conclude is that the form
selected by investors was, all things considered, better than the
alternatives.162
Any choice may have significant drawbacks, and
156. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 145. For a seminal work on transaction-cost
economics and the theory of the firm, see R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA
386 (1937), reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
157. For instance, partnership law provides a default rule for equal participation in
decisionmaking, regardless of the relative amounts contributed to the enterprise. See
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 202(a), 401(f) & (j) (1997). Investors may also choose to be
governed by the laws of any jurisdiction, regardless of where they intend to operate the
business.
158. See, e.g., RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 2 (“[F]irms may lack the resources to deal
expertly with multidimensional long-term contracting problems. The availability of sets of
default rules that fill the contracting gaps can be critical to these firms’ success.”).
159. See Posner, supra note 20, at 858 (noting that economic models of incomplete
contracts “predict that contracts will contain descriptions not of ‘physical’ contingencies but
of the bargaining procedures that parties must follow at the time of performance”).
160. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 242. Of course, to the extent a particular
jurisdiction offers a statutory or common law remedy for oppression, even if that provision is
inconsistent with other corporate law rules, the thorough-going contractarian must concede
that it is appropriate to apply that remedy, since the parties could have chosen to incorporate
elsewhere. See generally Ribstein, supra note 19.
161. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 34 (“Corporate law—and in
particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts—fills in the blanks . . . with the terms
that people would have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able to
transact costlessly in advance.”); Coffee, supra note 7, at 1622 (“Under this approach, the
parties will be deemed ex post to have consented ex ante to the term that would have been
most rational for them to specify; in short, rationality implies consent.”); Juliet P. Kostritsky,
Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World: What To Do When
Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 323, 342 (noting that the theory of transaction-cost economics holds that “courts should
supply default rules that mimic what ‘similarly situated’ parties would have consented to
absent transaction costs”).
162. See O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 218–19 (contending that logical choice-of-form
decisions, at least for decisions based on internal governance needs, can be arrayed along a
continuum from sole proprietorships to corporations depending on the need for adaptability
and concerns about opportunism). Indeed, one scholar contends that “the close corporation
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transaction costs limit the parties’ ability to rectify problems to the extent
that the parties are even aware of them.163 Thus, ordinary corporate law
rules may not resemble what the parties would actually have negotiated for
themselves.164 Indeed, substantial contrary evidence may exist concerning
what the parties intended.165
Nor will courts uphold the parties’ bargain by imposing the economically
rational terms that hypothetical investors might have wanted. First, the
choice-of-form theory leaves little room for judicial gap filling of any kind;
unmodified default rules are taken to embody the parties’ preferences.166
Second, even if the court identifies gaps in the explicit bargain, inserting
hypothetical terms based on economic theory may not reflect the parties’
actual understanding of their relationship.167 In fact, the assumption “that
rational parties would agree ex ante on whatever provision maximized
value, even if the resulting gains were to be unequally distributed,” is
highly implausible.168 As Professor John Coffee explains, “Nothing that we
know about the real world suggests that individuals are actually so risk
neutral as to behave in a fashion that is indifferent to the distribution of
gains and losses.”169 Moreover, in a close corporation, shareholders
“typically invest their human capital along with their financial capital” so
that “corporate decisions will affect the shareholders’ wealth other than
through the value of the stock (which is difficult to determine in any
event).”170 Consequently, we have little reason to expect shareholders to
“agree that the corporation should maximize firm value without regard to
risk or to the value of the shareholders’ other assets.”171
Although the hypothetical contract approach purports to advance the
parties’ own autonomy interests by helping them to avoid economically
was an evolutionary dead end because the corporate form could not be a satisfactory vehicle
for closely held firms.” RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 102.
163. See BECKER, supra note 50, at 7 (“The assumption that information is often seriously
incomplete because it is costly to acquire is used in the economic approach to explain the
same kind of behavior that is explained by irrational and volatile behavior . . . in other
discussions.”).
164. See George S. Geis, Economics as Context for Contract Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
569, 597–98 (2008).
165. For example, in one fairly typical case the evidence indicated that, despite the
background rule of at-will employment, the plaintiff “utilized his own funds . . . not simply
as an investment, but to provide employment and a future for himself.” In re Dissolution of
Wiedy’s Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (App. Div. 1985).
166. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1625 (observing that the hypothetical contract gapfilling methodology requires “an omitted term” and yet, because corporate law establishes a
“governance mechanism,” “the corporate contract may appear complete on its face”). In the
context of shareholder oppression, the default governance mechanism—majority rule—is
precisely the problem.
167. See Bratton, supra note 108, at 192 (“Hypothetical contract is a welfare norm
asserted by an academic. It is not a transactional artifact.”).
168. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1623.
169. Id. A court that focused only on overall wealth maximization “would ignore
important issues of distributive fairness.” Id.
170. Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of Corporation Law, 2 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 141, 149 (2005).
171. Id.
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irrational outcomes,172 it actually gets no closer to the parties’ real bargain
than does the blanket imposition of fiduciary duties drawn from partnership
law. In assuming either that close corporation shareholders embrace
partnership norms of behavior or instead that shareholders are driven to
maximize wealth, a court is applying an “untailored” rule most people
would supposedly choose, according to one or another theory, rather than
seeking the “tailored” rule that the parties involved in the dispute would
actually have wanted.173 We have no solid empirical basis for concluding
that one approach better captures the preferences of close corporation
shareholders than the other.
As discussed infra in Part V, courts should instead seek to enforce the
parties’ actual expectations, using equitable contract principles to evaluate
available evidence concerning the parties’ bargain.174 Encouragingly, this
seems to be the approach many courts follow, even when they describe the
relevant duties in fiduciary terms.175 These courts’ analyses begin with the
corporation’s articles of incorporation, by-laws, and any supplemental
written shareholder agreements but encompass all material evidence of the
parties’ understood bargain.176 The question of intent “is no trivial matter,
as a great virtue of contract law lies in its flexibility and in the freedom of
parties to make their own private laws.”177 Moreover, courts can
potentially reduce overall transaction costs by deterring opportunism, thus

172. Cf. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 27 (G.D.H. Cole trans.,
Prometheus Books 1988) (1761) (arguing that liberty is not diminished by the social
contract, even though “whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do
so”). According to Rousseau, “This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be
free . . . .” Id. Although a man loses “his natural liberty” through the social contract, he
acquires “moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere
impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is
liberty.” Id. at 27–28. Economic rationality might be viewed as such a law. The relationship
of rationality and freedom is deeply contested. See generally SEN, supra note 18. For sharp
criticism of Rousseau’s position, see generally ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in
LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
173. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 30 (distinguishing majoritarian default rules from
tailored default rules); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 101, at 91 (same).
174. Professor Coffee argues that default rules should be established to force greater
actual bargaining. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1623 (“The rationale for such a ‘coercive’
default rule is that it forces those possessing private information to disclose it to the
market—and hence results in more accurate pricing.”). While Coffee is right to observe that
“hypothetical bargaining is inferior to actual bargaining,” see id., penalty default rules may
be difficult to impose in close corporations, where shareholders often fail to bargain even
when it would be economically rational to do so.
175. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146 (Utah 2009) (holding that
termination of shareholder employee did not violate the majority’s fiduciary duty, because
the employee’s stock holdings “were not inextricably tied to his employment; they were a
separate investment in the company”); Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354
(Mass. 1996) (holding that, despite strong fiduciary duties, “there was no evidence that . . .
stockholders had expectations of continuing employment because they purchased stock”).
176. See MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 149, § 7.01[D], at 7-68 to 7-70 (identifying key
factors).
177. Geis, supra note 164, at 597–98 (observing that, in addition to efficiency
justifications, intent is considered “fundamental to most philosophical arguments for
upholding promises”).
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encouraging small corporate ventures that might be stifled if the
participants were forced to engage in expensive, protracted negotiations
beforehand.178
B. The Power of Social Norms
In addition to transaction costs that render the notion of complete
contracting fictional, courts should also account for the bargain-limiting but
socially beneficial phenomenon of interpersonal trust.179 If we believe that
our fellow investors will treat us fairly regardless of whether they have a
clearly defined legal obligation to do so, it may seem unnecessary to
bargain carefully against future opportunism.180 Trust facilitates business
relationships. In a sense, social norms represent the sunny side of nonrational choice.181
When participants in a business enterprise feel personally invested,
moreover, they show more loyalty and the willingness “to extend
themselves to the degree that corporations need today: to be flexible,
concerned, and willing to pitch in.”182 If “[t]hat’s what a social relationship
delivers,”183 then courts should be cautious about enforcing the logic of
market transactions to such an extent that all considerations of trust among
the parties become irrelevant.
Even when market norms work adequately as motivation, they may be
less efficient than social norms: “Money, as it turns out, is very often the
most expensive way to motivate people.”184 As one commentator observes,
“It’s remarkable how much work companies (particularly start-ups) can get
out of people when social norms (such as the excitement of building
something together) are stronger than market norms (such as salaries
stepping up with each promotion).”185 This is not to suggest that a close
178. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1624 (“[I]n the absence of certain judicially
administered mandatory terms, such as a duty of good faith, the costs of contracting would
be vastly increased, uncertainty would reign and litigation would become more likely.”);
O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 247 (“[R]ational investors might predict that courts will exercise
their equitable gap-filling powers to provide optimal governance rules to the parties ex post,
thereby making ex ante contracting unnecessary.”).
179. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 229 (“The bond between parents and
children, for example, constrains conflicts of interest.”). Trust can substitute for more
expensive contracting but “[i]t is . . . no accident that some of the famous cases dealing with
closely held corporations involve situations where these informal bonds have broken down
as a result of death, divorce, or retirement of the patriarch.” Id. at 229–30.
180. Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP. 137, 139 (2000) (“A substantial gap exists between the theoretical prediction that
self-interested individuals will have extreme difficulty in coordinating collective action and
the reality that such cooperative behavior is widespread, although far from inevitable.”).
181. See Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1760 (“Trust . . . can provide a motivation for
players in a social dilemma to choose the optimal, cooperative outcome over the individually
rational but suboptimal solution.”).
182. ARIELY, supra note 49, at 83.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 86; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 229 (observing that “familial or
other personal relations” typical of close corporations “reduce[] agency problems”).
185. ARIELY, supra note 49, at 83.
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corporation is or should be a non-market institution but simply a reminder
that “[s]ocial norms are not only cheaper, but often more effective as
well.”186
If we value social norms, requiring shareholders to bargain for protection
at their peril is not a recipe for preserving those norms.187 Indeed, in a
business context, “to trust someone is to lower one’s guard, to refrain from
taking precautions against an interaction partner, even when the other,
because of opportunism or incompetence, could act in a way that might
seem to justify precautions.”188 Under standard economic analysis, trust is
irrational, and yet personal relationships among shareholders are critical to
the success of the enterprise, lowering the cost of doing business.189
By relying on trust rather than bargained-for protection, shareholders
Assuming certain
may even seek “to induce trustworthiness.”190
protections are feasible and not ruled out by transaction costs, a minority
shareholder might nevertheless choose to do without those protections so
that the other participants would understand that the relationship is one
founded on trust.191 Experimental results indicate that this strategy works
best when the other party is aware “that one has refrained from taking
precautions that one might have taken.”192 This may in part explain why
dissension occurs so often in the second or third generation, long after the
founders have retired; trust may not be as transferable as stock.193
186. Id. at 86. For an argument that trust may be valuable because untrustworthy people
assume others are like them and will therefore avoid closely held businesses, see Blair &
Stout, supra note 11, at 1804. Of course, even if this is true, the next generation of owners
will not benefit. See id. (contending that conflict “can be explained as a consequence of the
fact that while the original founders of a closely held firm are subject to selective pressures
that favor trust . . . their heirs and successors are not”).
187. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 395 (“Too much emphasis on the possible failure of
the business is inconsistent with the positive effort necessary to establish the
enterprise . . . .”); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1806 (“Suppose a potential
business partner shows up armed with a lawyer and a ten-page contract loaded with fine
print. What does that behavior suggest?”).
188. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 344 (emphasis omitted).
189. See Krishnan S. Chittur, Resolving Close Corporation Conflicts: A Fresh Approach,
10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 130–31 (1987) (stating that investors “incorporate with
minimal fanfare, expecting that any subsequently discovered problem will be resolved
amicably and reasonably”); see also MANFRED F.R. KETS DE VRIES & RANDEL S. CARLOCK
WITH ELIZABETH FLORENT-TREACY, FAMILY BUSINESS ON THE COUCH: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 55 (2007):
Many successful family businesses see such trust as a core organizational value,
and design flexible organization structures to exploit it. Conversely, publiclytraded firms with short management tenures, especially at the top, often build
structures that assume distrust, and design defensive controls to protect against
self-serving behavior and conflicts of interest.
190. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 346 (emphasis omitted) (further observing that “[t]he idea
of taking precautions might be incompatible with the agent’s emotional attitude toward the
other person”).
191. See Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1805 (“The phenomenon of trust behavior
suggests . . . that sometimes participants in closely held corporations may deliberately
choose not to draft formal contracts, even when they could do so.”).
192. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 350.
193. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1804–05. The implications are debatable. Perhaps
the minority shareholder who consciously adopts a trust strategy should have no legal
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The social norm of trust operates in a “relational construct” and “cannot
be explained in terms of simple economic rationality.”194 For standard law
and economics, reliance on social norms makes sense only when transaction
costs bar any other option.195 For instance, if the parties thought that a
court would be likely to misconstrue their bargain in the minority’s favor,
and if it were difficult for the majority to price this risk, the parties might
prefer to live with the possibility of opportunism.196 Even so, the minority
would eschew judicial protection only where private ordering and other
market or reputational constraints offered a reasonable substitute.197
Although irrational from the perspective of standard law and economics,
trust can have powerful benefits. Consider, for instance, the classic
prisoner’s dilemma, in which two prisoners are isolated, and each prisoner
is given the choice of implicating the other prisoner or staying silent.198
The best coordinated decision would be to remain silent, but self-interest
indicates that each prisoner should point the finger and hope that the other
prisoner is foolish enough to stay silent:
If the prisoners pursue their own individual self-interest “rationally,” they
will end up with the worst possible outcome for both of them. But they
also can trust each other enough to accept the risk of retreating from their
own immediate interest in favor of a common solution that will benefit

recourse if it works out poorly. Indeed, if we assume participants understand the law,
background legal protection would seem to undermine the deliberate vulnerability that can
encourage trustworthiness. Or we might draw a more modest conclusion: since conspicuous
displays of trust can have a positive impact, and since intimate groups live on trust, we
should hesitate before holding close corporation shareholders to the requirements of pure
market rationality.
194. Michel Crozier, The Relational Boundaries of Rationality, in THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO POLITICS 306, 308 (Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 1991). We learn to trust
each other over time, as when business participants have a pre-existing relationship. Id. at
307 (“I trust John because over time I built a relationship that is strong enough for each of us
to know the other will live up to his word.”).
195. Yet law and economics scholars have recognized that social relationships can reduce
agency costs. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 229 (“Participants in closely
held corporations frequently have familial or other personal relations in addition to their
business dealings. The continuous and nonpecuniary nature of these relationships reduces
agency problems.”).
196. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 448 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.,
dissenting). Of course, this assumes that the risk of opportunism can be valued more
accurately than the risk of judicial error, a dubious assumption. See Thompson, supra note 2,
at 402 (“[I]t seems unlikely that the parties would have agreed that, upon the occurrence of
any disagreement, the majority shareholders would have the right to exclude the minority.
That right could not have been effectively priced by the minority at the beginning . . . .”).
197. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 402 (arguing in favor of mandatory rule that waiver
of fiduciary protections is irrational because “there are no other alternative checks” on
majority opportunism).
198. See Peter Kollock, Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. REV.
SOC. 183, 186 (1998) (“What defines the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the relative value of the four
outcomes. The best possible outcome is defecting while one’s partner cooperates . . . . The
next best outcome is mutual cooperation . . . followed by mutual defection . . ., with the
worst outcome being the case in which one cooperates while one’s partner defects . . . .”).
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each of them. The key variable in that case is trust. If there is no
possibility of communication, trust does not make any sense rationally.199

In addition to its instrumental value in overcoming problems of collective
irrationality, trust is also an attitude toward life. The standard law and
economics perspective leaves out the nonconsequential motivations that
individuals may have for their behavior.200 Although “[m]uch of economic
behavior is purely consequentialist,”201 investing a substantial proportion of
one’s time and wealth in a close corporation may be about means as well as
ends.202 If close corporation shareholders intend to make money but also
wish to participate with friends and family in a meaningful business
venture, a rational choice account of the investment decision will be
incomplete and misleading.203
To summarize, even if law and economics scholars were right to assume
that investors approximate the rational choice model when selecting the
corporate form and in negotiating their rights before investing, there would
still be a substantial role for judicial monitoring. Shareholder oppression
doctrine reduces the need for expensive ex ante bargaining, allowing the
participants to proceed with an incomplete agreement. Finally, by reducing
the need for hardnosed bargaining, laws that protect shareholders from
opportunism facilitate an atmosphere of trust.
IV. WHY CONTRACT THEORY JUSTIFIES SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
This part contends that contract theory, properly understood, offers the
best rationale for minority shareholder protection in close corporations.
Importantly, the “you made your bed” version of contract invoked by law
and economics does not actually exist—and for good reason.204 Since at
199. Crozier, supra note 194, at 307. Of course, close corporations lack the formal
structure of the prisoners’ dilemma because coordination is possible—indeed, the
contractarian objection emphasizes that shareholders ought to negotiate before investing.
The point is simply that, to the extent that a corporation can operate more efficiently if the
parties have a high degree of trust in one another, individually rational self-protection at each
stage of a corporation’s operation could lead to the collectively undesirable result of a
hobbled corporate enterprise.
200. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 81 (stating that “motivations may be consequentialist or
nonconsequentialist, that is, oriented either toward the outcome of action or toward the
action itself”).
201. Id. (“When people put aside money for their old age or stockbrokers buy and sell
shares, they attach no intrinsic value—positive or negative—to these actions themselves;
they care only about the outcomes.”).
202. By contrast, standard economic analysis assumes in every situation that “[r]ational
individuals invest their . . . capital with a view to maximizing the value of such resources.”
O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 220.
203. Arguably, the shareholders’ goals can be described in consequential terms, even if
they are non-monetary, but this still understates the extent to which social norms motivate
behavior. See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 83 (describing social norms as “a further special
case of nonconsequentialist behavior”).
204. Some law and economics scholars argue that contract law should shed its equitable
trappings, but that is a much broader discussion. It will suffice to observe here that the
contractarian critique of shareholder oppression doctrine is inconsistent with modern
contract law. For general criticism of the proposed revival of formalism in contract analysis,
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least the nineteenth century merger of law and equity, courts have placed
equitable limits on the substance of contract205 and have taken a substantial
ex post role in interpreting contract terms: “judicial determination of the
contractual obligation serves as a fallback mechanism for vindicating the
parties’ intent whenever a court determines that the formal contract terms
fall seriously short of achieving the parties’ purposes.”206
Part V.A contends that the close corporation bargain creates a long-term
relationship that may be broader and more nuanced than the terms that have
been reduced to writing.207 Part V.B argues that contract law’s implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing explains shareholder oppression
doctrine more convincingly than the fiduciary approach courts often claim
to follow. Part V.C shows that recent innovations in LLC law do not
reduce the need for equitable oversight of investor bargains, either in the
close corporation or the LLC context.
A. The Close Corporation as Relational Contract
In a “relational contract,” the parties intend to formalize a relationship
rather than commit to a discrete transaction.208 Thus, “[a] contract is
see Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern
Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 943 (2009).
205. For instance, courts refuse to enforce liquidated damages provisions that provide for
recovery exceeding actual damages. Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and
the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1043–44 (2009) (describing
“the penalty doctrine” and other equitable limitations to common law contract doctrine,
including “equitable exceptions to the parol evidence rule” and a “part-performance
exception to the Statute of Frauds”).
206. Id. at 1025. Professors Kraus and Scott dislike this “judicial insurance policy against
formal contract terms” because they contend that sophisticated parties may prefer to limit the
scope of judicial interpretation, and enforcing the parties’ “ends” can interfere with the
enforcement of their selected “means.” Id. at 1025–27 (“Sometimes the only way to maintain
fidelity to the parties’ contractual intent is to enforce the formal contract terms to which they
agreed, even when doing so defeats their contractual ends.”). Assuming that some parties
make a rational tradeoff between litigation costs and opportunism, however, it blinkers
reality to assume that all “firms organized in corporate form with five or more employees”
count as “‘sophisticated economic actors.’” Id. at 1026 n.6 (citing Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 545 (2003)).
Also, because controlling shareholders can usually protect themselves without the assistance
of a court, the risk of opportunism falls disproportionately on the minority shareholders.
Before we assume that close corporation shareholders may have intended their “means” to
trump their “ends,” we should recall that they are situated differently: controlling
shareholders would receive most of the benefits of the tradeoff and minority shareholders
would bear most of the costs.
207. See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (observing that in
close corporations “[t]he parties’ full understanding may not even be in writing but may have
to be construed from their actions”).
208. For foundational work in relational contract theory, see Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); see also Eisenberg, supra note 55,
at 816 (defining the relational contract concept: “What is especially striking about the
numerous efforts to define relational contracts . . . is that a straightforward definition . . . is
readily at hand. The obvious definition of a relational contract is a contract that involves not
merely an exchange, but also a relationship, between the contracting parties.”). Professor
Eisenberg contends that what is needed, however, is not a special doctrine of relational
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relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important
terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations.”209 Indeed, even
though the parties to a relational contract may anticipate certain issues, they
will often be unable to resolve those issues in advance.210 Typically,
relational contracts involve long-term arrangements, “but temporal
extension per se is not the defining characteristic.”211
Close corporations are quintessential relational contracts.212
The
founding shareholders negotiate a long-term, open-ended relationship with
each other for the general purpose of operating a profitable business.
Moreover, shareholder relations are often bolstered by preexisting business
or family connections.213 No matter how cogent their business plan, the
parties will need to remain involved and flexible, because the needs of the
business will evolve over time.214 Some potential problems cannot be
solved in advance without creating new ones. For instance, even if the
parties anticipate the possibility of shareholder dissension, specific contract
provisions cannot supplant the role of good faith; the minority might
opportunistically exploit strong exit rights or veto powers. Yet without
those rights, the majority can use its control to disadvantage the minority.215
Although few law and economics scholars would deny that close
corporation governance is “relational,” the law and economics model leaves
no room for an evolving, flexible bargain governed more by good faith than
by specific contract terms.216 Rather, law and economics theory builds
upon a vision of contract “as ‘nothing more than a sale with a time
lag . . . distributing risk.’”217 In a discrete exchange, the parties owe no
contract but a greater appreciation of relational aspects that impact the interpretation of any
contract. See id. at 817.
209. Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, at 1091.
210. See id. (“[D]efinitive obligations may be impractical because of inability to identify
uncertain future conditions or because of inability to characterize complex adaptations
adequately even when the contingencies themselves can be identified in advance.”). Thus,
relational contract theory “borders closely on the field of transaction-cost economics.”
Coffee, supra note 7, at 1619 n.5.
211. Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, at 1091.
212. Moll, supra note 32, at 756 (“[T]he investment bargains entered into by close
corporation shareholders reflect the characteristics of relational contracts.”).
213. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691,
751 (1974) (observing that “the creation of a new joint enterprise, such as a business
partnership or close corporation, is normally preceded by other business relations giving rise
to a willingness to go into a deeper relation”).
214. Moll, note 32, at 756 (“[T]he very nature of employment and management bargains
requires the ongoing personal involvement of the parties.”).
215. As I have previously argued, the possibility of shareholder oppression is a seemingly
unavoidable consequence of the informal, efficient operation of a close corporation. See
Means, supra note 59, at 1209. Courts have sought to provide ex post relief to minority
shareholders where appropriate without undermining the ex ante flexibility that makes the
close corporation form attractive. See id.
216. As discussed supra Part IV, standard law and economics assumes that rational
investors will address contractual incompleteness through the choice of business form and
selective tailoring of default rules.
217. Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the
Need for a “Rich Classificatory Apparatus”, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1020 (1981) (citation
omitted); Joo, supra note 41, at 805 (“In corporations theory, though not in contract theory,
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duties prior to contract, and all duties are specified in the contract.218 By
presupposing an arm’s-length bargain, standard law and economics misses
much of what matters in corporate governance arrangements.219
Consequently, viewing corporate governance through the lens of standard
law and economics contract theory produces a distorted and incomplete
picture. Because a corporate venture is a relationship more than it is a
discrete bargain, courts properly turn to equitable principles when necessary
to honor the parties’ intent and to prevent opportunistic abuse of the
contractual relationship.220
To be clear, the argument advanced here is not that relational contract
constitutes a distinct legal category or that special rules of contract
interpretation should apply. Rather, relational contract theory suggests an
approach to the interpretation of all contracts, focusing on matters that
receive little or no attention under standard economic analysis.221 In
particular, as discussed in the next two sections, a relational contract
approach helps us to see why agreements governing shareholder
relationships are highly vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation and to
identify equitable aspects of contract theory that explain and justify the
judicial protection of the parties’ reasonable expectations.
1. Shareholder Oppression as Opportunism
A literal bargain of any complexity can be exploited opportunistically—
think of all the tales involving genies, lamps, and wishes gone awry—and
equitable considerations inform every contractual relationship.222 Indeed,
the careful judicial response to the problem of minority shareholder
oppression in close corporations can be understood as an application of
equitable contracting principles.223 The implied covenant of good faith and

the battle over the terrain of ‘contract’ is essentially over. The free-market . . . connotations
of CONTRACT . . . have taken firm root . . . .”).
218. Macneil, supra note 217, at 1019.
219. For instance, in a close corporation, shareholders are unlikely to draft a new contract
to reflect every alteration of the business relationship. See Moll, supra note 32, at 760
(“Under the relational theory, the parties expect that the terms of their relationship will
evolve. There is no need for formalities to validate new practices in order to make those
practices part of the contract.”) (citation omitted).
220. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3.13, at
155–56 (4th ed. 1998).
221. To the extent all contracts are more relational than they are discrete, the norms of
relational contracting may entirely occupy the field. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 817
(arguing that no legally significant distinction between relational and discrete contracts is
possible, and that separate legal rules are unnecessary because “relational contracts and
contracts are virtually one and the same”). If this is a slippery slope, the end result seems
desirable.
222. See, e.g., Kraus & Scott, supra note 205, at 1025 (“Honoring the contractual intent
of the parties is the central objective of contract law.”).
223. See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 809–10 (“Because the objective of contract law
should be to further the interests of the contracting parties, the rules of contract law must
often be formulated so that their application will turn on the particular circumstances of the
parties’ transactions and, in certain cases, on the parties’ subjective intentions.”).
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fair dealing fills in gaps in the parties’ agreement and limits their ability to
exploit control provisions in unforeseen circumstances.224
The covenant can be stated plainly: if the literal terms of a contract allow
one party to do something that the other party clearly would not have
countenanced if consulted in advance, then the conduct at issue is bad-faith
opportunism.225 For instance, a majority’s argument that the default rules
of corporate law give it the power to decide all questions concerning
dividends and employment should not, without more, dispose of a specific
shareholder oppression claim brought by a minority shareholder who has
been denied any financial return on her investment. Minority shareholder
oppression, therefore, can be understood as nothing more than a special
case of the opportunistic conduct courts police in all contracts.226
Even staunch defenders of the bargain-for-it-if-you-want-it approach to
shareholder rights in close corporations acknowledge that “[t]he problem of
distinguishing legitimate exercise of contract rights from opportunistic
behavior is pervasive in the law of contracts.”227 This admission matters
because it shows that contract analysis requires more than a parsing of
written terms. Courts can view shareholder disputes in contractual terms
without any overlay of fiduciary duty and still protect minority shareholders
from abusive overreaching by the majority.

224. For an argument emphasizing a need for constraints on contracting, see Thompson,
supra note 2, at 394 (“A close corporation is like a long-term relational contract in which
benefits for all parties necessarily depend on unstated assumptions. A fully contingent
contract cannot be drafted, so some ex post settling up by courts is used to support these
assumptions.”). Professor Thompson contends that mandatory rules are necessary “[t]o the
extent that corporate law is the intersection of a variety of relational contracts which reflect
expectations that cannot be specified in distinct transactions.” Id. at 387. Thus, he concludes
that “[t]here are times when law does not and should not yield to private ordering, either
because of third party effects or because of distrust of the bargain between the parties.” Id. at
379.
225. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986). Professor
Ribstein adds that opportunistic conduct takes “selfish advantage” of “the literal terms of the
contract” and “gaps or costs of the legal system.” RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 17. For further
definitions of “opportunism,” see supra note 12.
226. See MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 149, § 7.01[E], at 7-131 (stating that the “tension
between (1) enforcing a contract as written, and (2) construing a contract to prohibit
opportunistic conduct, is present in a number of oppression disputes.”). To the extent some
law and economics scholars have acknowledged the complexity of shareholder bargains and
intermittent need for judicial monitoring, the relational-contract theory provides a context for
those concessions. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 108, at 192 (contending that even in the
canonical work of the contractarian movement, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel
“avoid modeling internal relationships in the discrete transactional terms that prevail in
neoclassical microeconomic analyses of corporate arrangements” and instead implicitly
adopt “the relational contract paradigm”).
227. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 248 n.29. Under an earlier, more
formalistic model of contract, objective intent ruled and considerations of good faith would
have been irrelevant. See Smith & King, supra note 80, at 5–7 (contrasting classical and
neoclassical contract theory). Both versions of contract law “rely heavily on a stylized
image of exchange involving two roughly equal parties.” Id. at 7.

2010]

SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION LAW

1199

Judicial gap filling has its limits, of course, because litigation costs
money and time, and courts cannot always ascertain the parties’ intent.228
Whether a party is enjoying the benefit of its bargain or behaving
opportunistically may not always be clear. Consequently, there may be
many cases where minority shareholders decide that litigation is not
feasible or where no recourse will be available. Nevertheless, an imperfect
remedy for minority shareholders is better than none at all.229
2. Reasonable Expectations in a Relational Contract
As a descriptive account, the relational contract perspective, unlike the
standard law and economics alternative, offers a coherent explanation of
shareholder oppression doctrine.230 In a growing number of jurisdictions,
courts evaluate claims of oppression by asking whether the majority has
deprived the minority of the objectively reasonable expectations that
motivated its investment.231 In other words, has the majority abused its
control so as to deprive the minority of the benefit of its bargain?
Conduct that is contrary to the reasonable expectations of the parties will
also run afoul of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied
in every contract. This has an important practical consequence: rather than
228. For instance, courts must decide whether silence on a point reflects an intention to
exclude or simply a lack of attention: “A missing term likely means that the parties did not
want it, but it could mean that they were ignorant . . . .” EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 1, at 238. It may also be difficult to see how the parties intended their negotiated
provisions to interact with background rules of law. See Larry Ribstein, Contracting for
Termination
of
an
LLC,
IDEOBLOG
(Dec.
22,
2009,
5:29
AM),
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/12/contracting-for-termination-of-an-llc.html.
The problem with the [oppression] remedy is that it may be hard to square with the
contract. After all, the whole reason for the remedy is that the contract does not
provide for exit, yet the court is providing one. One might say that the parties in
effect adopted the statutory default rules, including the oppression remedy. But it
still may not be clear how the parties wanted those defaults to fit with their
agreement.
Id. (citation omitted).
229. If law and economics scholars could show that the overall cost of judicial
involvement in close corporation business disputes outweighs its benefits, then perhaps
“penalty default” rules that force minority shareholders to bargain at their peril would be
appropriate. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 101, at 93 (“If it is costly for the courts to
determine what the parties would have wanted, it may be efficient to choose a default rule
that induces the parties to contract explicitly.”). As discussed supra Part II, however, close
corporation shareholders systematically fail to bargain in advance to protect their interests.
A penalty default approach would have harsh consequences for existing shareholders and
only a hazy, speculative impact on future parties.
230. Cf. Posner, supra note 20, at 863 (stating that, given the inability of economic
models to predict behavior, “we are left with a sterile normative defense of freedom of
contract”). In particular, “the premise of full rationality does not seem right, for it predicts
contractual structures that bear little resemblance to the contracts designed by real parties.”
Id. Thus contracts may be incomplete both because of “the cost of negotiating and writing”
the agreement and because of “cognitive limits of the parties, which include the inability to
foresee future events and maybe something more.” Id. at 866.
231. See Matheson & Maler, supra note 4, at 679. Admittedly, we may have difficulty
determining what is objectively reasonable when some but not all aspects of the agreement
have been reduced to writing.
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arguing across a seemingly unbridgeable chasm between those who would
offer special protections for minority shareholders and those who would
not, we can focus instead on the meaning of “good faith” and other wellaccepted equitable contract principles.232 However we may choose to
define good faith, the use of contract interpretation principles to inform
reasonable expectations analysis rebuts the contractarian objection that
those who would protect minority shareholders are simply making it up as
they go along.233
Thus, the equation of oppression doctrine and equitable contract analysis
clarifies that while the reasonable expectations standard requires courts to
exercise judgment—based on careful analysis of the parties’ overall
relationship—it does not invite courts to create a different set of rights and
obligations for the parties than those they intended to assume. A minority
shareholder’s expectations reflect the parties’ objective intentions both at
the time of investment and as the relationship has evolved over time.234
Equitable contract analysis permits courts to recognize and enforce the
parties’ “true” bargain, even if it lacks the definiteness that contract law
doctrine might require in the context of a discrete exchange.235 Some
flexibility is critical if courts are to identify and redress oppression; at the
same time, it is fundamental to contract law that a court “may not substitute
its own notions of fairness for the terms of the agreement reached by the
parties.”236
Another advantage of equitable contract theory is that it helps explain
why minority investors should not be permitted to insist upon their
“expectations” without also holding up their end of the bargain. As some
commentators have observed, reasonable expectations analysis can mislead
courts into believing that only minority expectations count.237 For example,
232. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1654–55 (discussing various definitions and concluding
that “it may be easier to define ‘bad faith’ than ‘good faith’”).
233. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 1, at 955 (describing shareholder oppression remedies
as a “‘wild card’ that creates costly uncertainty for parties to closely held firms”). In
previous work, I have expressed concern that “reasonable expectations” analysis, without
some guiding principle, may be circular. See Means, supra note 59, at 1227. However, the
problem of circularity can be alleviated by offering “a deeper theory of shareholder rights
and obligations.” Id. Contract theory is useful in this respect.
234. To the extent some jurisdictions may exclude post-investment expectations, they
should reconsider that stance. See Moll, supra note 32, at 720 (“A strict time of investment
standard . . . seems to ignore the possibility that post-investment expectations may arise.”).
235. Professor Douglas Moll is right to observe that “[a]lthough both oppression
precedents and contract precedents base their decisions on breached ‘agreements’ and
‘understandings’ between the parties, it is clear that different meanings are ascribed to these
terms.” Moll, supra note 4, at 1066. Professor Moll concludes, however, that “it is fair to
assert that oppression law is doing what contract law should be doing if contract law took a
broader perspective when identifying and enforcing bargains.” Id. at 1073. As described in
this Article, a relational theory of contract takes that “broader perspective.”
236. See Lola Cars Int’l Ltd. v. Krohn Racing, LLC, Nos. 4479, 4886, 2009 WL 4052681,
at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2009).
237. See Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations:
Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371, 398 (2003)
(contending that “the focus on the minority’s expectations rather than on the majority’s
duties tends to subvert the principle of majority rule in corporate governance and to penalize
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in a case where a minority shareholder (who was also an employee) had
assaulted another employee and damaged a customer’s personal property, a
court found that terminating the shareholder’s employment somehow
violated his reasonable expectations.238 In another case, a court found in
favor of the minority shareholder and stated baldly that “[w]hether the
controlling shareholders discharged petitioner for cause or in their good
business judgment is irrelevant.”239 If courts used equitable contract
principles to define “reasonable expectations,” the difference between a
shareholder’s conditional expectation of employment and rights owed by
virtue of shareholder status would be clear.240 Under contract analysis,
employment is not an absolute right; unclean hands should bar equitable
relief.241 Put differently, it is not reasonable to expect continued
employment when egregious cause exists for termination.
Some might object that contract theory cannot explain shareholder
oppression doctrine because of the time inconsistency of shareholder
investment. Indeed, the corporation may include “shareholders who have
made no investment” and “who receive their shares as gifts or
inheritances.”242
For those shareholders, there is no bargained-for
investment decision. Moreover, even if some change to the previous
shareholder relationship were contemplated, “a modification under contract
law requires additional consideration to be enforceable.”243 If equitable
contract analysis covered only first generation investors and offered no
insight into reasonable expectations among close corporation shareholders
who invested or inherited shares anytime after formation, contract theory
would fail to account for the judicial protection of minority shareholders.
However, the rights of post-founding investors and even those who take
their shares as a gift or an inheritance can be clarified by analysis of the
parties’ understood bargain. First, it is worth underscoring that reasonable

conduct of the majority even when justified”); Moll, supra note 92, at 806–07 (identifying a
“pure minority perspective” that ignores evidence of “[a] minority shareholder’s misconduct
or incompetence in his job” if the plaintiff can show that there was a “basic understanding of
employment”).
238. See Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994); see also Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL
532605, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002) (finding that plaintiff “was hardly a model
employee” but that his termination was not justified because, “as a founder and a nearly onethird minority shareholder, he was entitled to the utmost good faith and fair dealing”). The
plaintiff’s termination followed an e-mail message interpreted by the defendants as a threat
of violence. Id. at *4.
239. In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1980). For further criticism of this
decision, see Art, supra note 237, at 396–97; Moll, supra note 92, at 767–69.
240. Cf. Art, supra note 237, at 417–18 (assuming flaws in reasonable expectations
approach and contending that courts should instead use fiduciary analysis to identify
oppression).
241. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 3 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.4, at 164–65 (3d
ed. 2004) (listing “equity’s colorful maxims” embodying the equitable restrictions, including
“one who comes into equity must come with clean hands”).
242. Moll, supra note 32, at 720.
243. Id. at 751–52 (citing JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 5-14, at 262 (3d ed. 1987)).
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expectations analysis does not give courts an open-ended license to meddle
in a corporation’s internal affairs in order to produce a “fairer” result; noninvesting minority shareholders cannot claim an entitlement to valuable
rights they never bargained for and that are not conveyed by shareholder
status alone. For instance, the fact that an original shareholder worked for
the business does not guarantee employment for his heirs, who may be
incompetent, disinterested, or both. Thus, the lack of remedy available for
some types of claims may be a virtue of the contractual approach.244
Second, because contributions to small corporate enterprises are often
“team specific,” meaning that resources committed to the business cannot
be moved elsewhere without substantial loss of value,245 it would seem
plausible to treat those contributions over time as the equivalent of other
forms of bargained-for consideration. For instance, if a second generation
shareholder spent her entire adult life working for the corporation, and
profits were distributed substantially through salary, the fact that she did not
pay for her shares initially should not preclude an argument that she had a
reasonable expectation of continued employment based on an understood
bargain among the shareholders without which she would not have
contributed her labor. The issue should be whether the evidence supports
her claim despite the lack of an explicit employment agreement, not
whether contract law permits her to make the argument.246
Finally, although contract theory illuminates shareholder oppression law,
corporations are only metaphorically contractual.247 If specific contract law
doctrines make no sense in the context of close corporations, they should be
jettisoned. Moreover, the centrality of contract values to shareholder
oppression analysis does not negate the existence of other important
values.248 For instance, there may be circumstances in which legitimate
and important business purposes should take priority over the minority’s
otherwise reasonable expectations. Likewise, there may be cases where the
majority has abused its control as part of a scheme to freeze out the
minority, even though the minority had no enforceable expectation
concerning the particular matter at issue. On the whole, though, equitable

244. See, e.g., Whitehorn v. Whitehorn Farms, Inc., 195 P.3d 836, 842 (Mont. 2008)
(holding that plaintiff shareholder had no reasonable expectation of dividends because he
received his shares as a gift, and the corporation had no history of paying dividends).
245. See Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 1755 (noting that “contracting difficulties can
discourage investment in team production, especially when invested resources become ‘team
specific,’ so that team members cannot walk away from the project without losing some of
the value of their investment”).
246. Professor Moll discusses an analogous case where a shareholder investor does not
expect employment at the time capital is contributed—unlike his fellow investors—but that
expectation alters in the first months of the venture. As Professor Moll points out, it would
seem anomalous to allow the other shareholders to terminate his employment years later,
despite the “near-equivalence of the minority shareholders’ situations.” Moll, supra note 32,
at 719.
247. See Joo, supra note 41, at 805.
248. For further discussion of value pluralism and shareholder oppression law, see
Benjamin Means, The Vacuity of Wilkes, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (draft
on file with author).

2010]

SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION LAW

1203

contract theory sets forth appropriate contours for shareholder oppression
law.
B. A Modest Role for Fiduciary Duties
Some commentators contend not just that contract analysis has limits but
also that it is an unhelpful way of framing the corporate relationship. These
commentators assert that strong fiduciary duties, akin to those owed by
partners—which go further than the basic loyalty and care provisions
applicable to corporate managers—are needed in order to protect minority
shareholders from oppression at the hands of controlling shareholders.249
On this view, no plausible interpretation of the parties’ actual bargain can
substitute for mandatory duties that enforce an appropriate code of
conduct.250
Yet, the objection to contractual analysis assumes a narrow version of
contract based on a classical model of discrete exchange.251 If contract
analysis had no ability to respond to the problems posed by relational
contract and required us to reject all judicial monitoring of the parties’
relationship as “neo-Marxist” meddling,252 then we would have a clear
choice to make between contract and fiduciary duty analysis.253 However,
if contract law is understood to include a strong obligation of good faith and
fair dealing, and if courts can use that obligation to fill gaps in the parties’
249. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of “Alternative Entities”: From Tax
Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 445, 470 (2009) (“In short, to rely on the contractual duty of good faith as a substitute for
fiduciary duty is akin to replacing heavy cream with skim milk.”); Sandra K. Miller, The
Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory
Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609
(2004) (contending that fiduciary obligations are the key to preventing freeze outs in LLCs
and that contractual duty of good faith is not an adequate substitute).
250. See Kleinberger, supra note 249, at 469 (“History suggests that contractual good
faith and fiduciary duty are not functional equivalents; they developed independently to
serve different values.”). Professor Kleinberger contends that “[p]roperly understood, the
contractual duty is ancillary and subservient to the contractual arrangements.” Id. Thus,
good faith’s “function is to allow the contract to mean what it says; it is therefore of no use
to police misconduct that is outside the contract.” Id. at 469–70. However, what is within
the scope of the parties’ agreement is itself subject to interpretation, so the distinction
between contractual and extra-contractual duties may be less crisp than Professor
Kleinberger’s argument seems to assume.
251. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty Into Contract, 41
TULSA L. REV. 451, 452 (2006) (arguing in context of unincorporated business associations
against “trying to replace an established duty of loyalty with weak and nebulous notions of
good faith”). Professor Dibadj contends that good faith analysis “deploys outworn economic
concepts reminiscent of the neoclassical Chicago School . . . based on facile assumptions
applied in a static manner.” Id. Professor Dibadj rejects the possibility of a more
“sophisticated contract theory” and does not consider the relational-contract approach
recommended here. Id. at 463–64.
252. See Dalley, supra note 1, at 222.
253. This assumes, of course, that we could agree on the meaning of fiduciary duty. See,
e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (“Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in AngloAmerican law.”); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2002) (“Fiduciary law is messy.”).

1204

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

contract consistent with the parties’ reasonable expectations, then fiduciary
duties can be confined for the most part to the traditional duty of loyalty
owed by directors and controlling shareholders in all corporations.254
Once we recognize that contract analysis has an equitable component,
“[f]iduciary and good faith duties may be difficult to distinguish in
practice.”255 This is especially true for a contract governing a long-term
relationship, because so much depends on good faith performance by the
parties in situations that cannot be fully anticipated in advance. Taken
seriously, the duty of good faith gives courts ample ability to regulate
shareholder relationships. One court explained, in the context of a limited
partnership:
If in each contract the parties had to expressly describe and prohibit every
artifice by which the parties could potentially deprive each other of the
fruits of their agreement, then contracts would soon become as long as the
tax code, as difficult to interpret, and (like the tax code) still contain
innumerable loopholes available to a party that wished to avoid the spirit
of its bargain.256

The court concluded that it is preferable “to treat a contract for what it is—
an exchange of solemn promises—and enforce the objectively reasonable
expectations of the parties.”257
In fact, a relational contract model may sometimes afford minority
shareholders greater protection than would a fiduciary alternative. For
instance, “[w]hen directors consider a dividend policy, they are not

254. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). In exercising
control, shareholder directors are subject to “usual fiduciary duties in acting on behalf of the
corporation.” Dalley, supra note 1, at 212. Some may object that a move away from a
stronger conception of fiduciary duty represents “a significant dilution of fiduciary duty as
an aspirational precept to guide the conduct of corporate power holders in favor of rules
protecting Holmes’s ‘bad man’ from unintentionally incurring liability.” Lawrence E.
Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675,
1681–82 (1990) (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457, 461 (1897)). However, this gives too little attention to the duty of good faith.
Whether or not good faith is an “aspirational” concept, it precludes parties from acting
opportunistically while also recognizing the fact that parties need to know what the law
requires in order to comply with it.
255. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES
219 (4th ed. 2009).
256. Or. RSA No. 6, Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular of Or. Ltd. P’ship, 840 F. Supp. 770,
776 (D. Or. 1993), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 76 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1996); see also
Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1465 (“Because of the difficulty of predicting and planning for
future events and their impact on a business enterprise, an opportunistic shareholder who
controls one or more aspects of a closely held corporation will often find ways to exploit
bargained-out structural and distributional rules that seemed both fair and complete at the
time of the bargain.”).
257. Castle Rock Cellular, 840 F. Supp. at 776. As the Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court recently argued in the context of LLC law, courts are perfectly capable of
enforcing the parties’ true bargain and curbing opportunism through a contractual analysis.
See Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 232 (2009)
(“[A]ny ‘bad acting’ will be ferreted out by the parties’ bargain and the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.”).
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‘interested’ because their interest is no different from that of the other
stockholders, even if some or all of the directors have personal situations
that lead them to prefer one policy over another.”258 Because the minority
shareholders cannot allege a violation of the duty of loyalty, the managers’
decision will be protected by the business judgment rule, and there will be
no recourse for the minority. To the extent that the parties’ investment
bargain included a particular policy with respect to dividends, however, a
shareholder could conceivably establish a contract-based claim.259
Moreover, there is no question that relational contract duties are owed to the
contracting parties. With respect to fiduciary duty, “it is not clear whether
the duty is owed to the other stockholders directly or whether it is owed to
the corporation and only derivatively benefits the minority stockholder.”260
In a recent decision involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in a
close corporation, Delaware Chancellor William Chandler remarked upon
the absence of any claims for breach of contract.261 The minority
shareholder, eBay, had bargained for certain protections (including
cumulative voting, which guaranteed it the ability to elect one member of
the three-person board of directors) in connection with its investment in
craigslist.262 When it became clear that the parties’ longer-term goals were
not aligned, eBay exercised its contractual rights to launch a competing
venture.263 Craigslist’s controlling shareholder responded by taking steps
to ensure, among other things, that eBay would no longer be able to elect a
representative to craigslist’s board of directors.264 eBay argued that the
controlling shareholders had breached their fiduciary duty, and Chancellor
Chandler observed that
[t]hroughout this dispute, I have repeatedly read and listened to what look
and sound like breach of contract arguments, which eBay uses not to
prove [that the controlling shareholders] breached a contract, but rather to
prove [that they] breached their fiduciary duties. This has been an odd
258. Dalley, supra note 1, at 217; see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
720–21 (Del. 1971) (distinguishing dividend policy established by controlling shareholder
that included minority shareholders and was therefore protected by the business judgment
rule and dealings with subsidiary that allegedly transferred assets to another subsidiary
wholly owned by the controlling shareholder, thus excluding the minority from a
proportional share of the return).
259. This is not to say that the evidence would often support a claim, but only that the
business judgment rule would not effectively bar it.
260. Dalley, supra note 1, at 179.
261. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, No. 3705, 2010 WL 3516473, at *18
(Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2010).
262. Id. at *5. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, craigslist enacted a “new charter [that]
provides for a three-person board of directors to be elected under a cumulative voting
regime. The mechanics of cumulative voting ensured that eBay could use its 28.4% stake in
craigslist to unilaterally elect one of the three members to the craigslist board.” Id.
263. Id. at *6 (“[T]he Shareholders’ Agreement does expressly and unequivocally permit
eBay to compete but guarantees certain consequences should eBay do so.”). Loss of
cumulative voting rights is not one of the specified consequences, however. See id.
264. Id. at *12 (noting that the controlling shareholders sought to identify “capital
structure or corporate governance changes that . . . would make it impossible for eBay to
place a director on the board and would limit eBay’s ability to purchase additional craigslist
shares”).
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exercise, and I admit I am puzzled by eBay’s decision not to bring a
breach of contract claim or, more promising perhaps, a claim for breach of
the implied covenant, considering eBay expended significant effort
arguing that the 2008 Board Actions violated both the technical provisions
and the spirit of the [Stock Purchase Agreement] and the Shareholders’
Agreement.265

Ultimately, craigslist’s controlling shareholders succeeded in blocking
eBay’s ability to appoint a board member by amending craigslist’s charter
to create a staggered board. For eBay’s cumulative-voting right to matter,
all three members of the board must stand for election at the same time. By
altering the voting rules such that only one director would be elected each
year, the controlling shareholders ensured that eBay would never have the
voting power to elect a director. Arguably, this maneuver was not in good
faith, given the parties’ explicit contractual bargain. But eBay did not
allege any contractual violation, and so the court did not formally resolve
the issue.266
Admittedly, fiduciary duties borrowed from partnership law could be
applied expansively to require the operating majority to exercise control in
the interest of the minority.267 This would address the problem of minority
shareholder oppression quite effectively but would also defeat the purpose
of acquiring control and contradict the basic majoritarian premise of
corporate law.268 As the Chief Judge of the Delaware Supreme Court has
observed, “The danger in applying default fiduciary duties is that, rather
than determining the ex ante intent of the parties as contemplated by their
agreement, a court might be wooed by plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claims and
accept their proposal to apply an ex post fiduciary duty analysis.”269 If
applied expansively, a fiduciary norm of selflessness would conflict with a
shareholder’s basic right of “selfish ownership.”270
265. Id. at *18.
266. It should be noted, however, that the court expressed considerable skepticism about
the merits of such an argument, since eBay’s right to compete caused its bargained-for
protections to elapse, and one of these protections was “the contractual right . . . to consent
to any charter amendment that would ‘adversely affect [] [eBay].’” Id. at *26. The court
opined that “the Staggered Board Amendments cannot be inequitable because they were
exactly the sort of consequence eBay accepted would occur if eBay decided to compete with
craigslist.” Id..
267. See Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)
(“[R]ecognizing the fiduciary nature of a relationship does not give it content in any given
context.”). If one wanted to apply a strong version of fiduciary duty, there is in traditional
fiduciary law a normative requirement of “selflessness” that goes far beyond the
requirements imposed upon parties to an ordinary contract. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1658
(“The traditional fiduciary ethic insists that the fiduciary act selflessly.”). Thus, “a
contracting party may seek to advance his own interests in good faith while a fiduciary may
not . . . .” Id.
268. Also, fiduciary duty analysis could inhibit the parties’ ability to create a bargain that
suits their particular needs. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1625 (“The problem with traditional
fiduciary theory is its hostility to all forms of contractual innovation.”). Equitable contract
analysis works with the parties’ bargain.
269. Steele, supra note 257, at 236.
270. Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006) (noting tension and holding
that courts should strike a “proper balance between the majority’s ‘concede[d] . . . rights to
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In our efforts to remedy minority shareholder oppression, we should
remember also that the default rules of partnership law create different but
not necessarily lesser dangers of opportunism:
Partnership form . . . exposes majority partners to two risks: the risk
that a minority partner will extort unfair changes in team rules by
opportunistically threatening to dissolve the partnership and the risk that a
minority partner will shirk, content in the belief that the majority will be
unwilling to expel her for fear that a court might label the resulting
dissolution wrongful.271

Strong fiduciary principles that impede majority control expose
corporations to attempts by minority investors to rewrite the rules in their
own favor.272 Also, fiduciary standards, if interpreted too broadly, may
stand in the way of the parties’ actual bargain.273 Accordingly, the
argument that close corporations should be treated as if they were
partnerships is unpersuasive.274 General corporate fiduciary duties imposed
on corporate managers and on controlling shareholders to prevent theft of
corporate opportunities and other property of the business offer important
protection to minority investors, but equitable contract theory provides
surer footing for shareholder oppression law.
C. LLCs and the Choice-of-Form Objection
The relatively recent LLC form of business organization offers
substantial advantages for privately owned businesses.275 No longer must
investors choose between the management and exit rights of partnership
law on the one hand and the limited liability of the corporate form on the
other; the LLC provides the attractive aspects of both on a default basis.276
Also, for investors concerned about unclear fiduciary norms, the LLC’s
more explicitly contract-oriented format may be preferable.277
what has been termed ‘selfish ownership,’’ and the minority’s reasonable expectations of
benefit from its shares.”) (internal citation omitted).
271. O’Kelley, supra note 2, at 238.
272. For an application of fiduciary duty to a minority shareholder who wielded veto
power, see Smith v. Atlantic Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. 1981).
273. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, at 1127 (“Rather than deriving its justification
from the terms of the contract itself, [the fiduciary obligation] is imposed as a condition of
the relationship, irrespective of efforts by individual bargainers to negotiate an alternative
standard.”).
274. It may be that the strong notion of selfless conduct lacks coherence, even in the
partnership context, except perhaps as an articulation of norms of fair dealing. See RIBSTEIN,
supra note 10, at 171 (arguing that appropriate results in partnership disputes can be
achieved through “a marginal constraint on selfish conduct” without also imposing “a broad
prohibition on self-gain”).
275. See Miller, supra note 249, at 1609–10 (noting that “entrepreneurs have an
unparalleled range of choices for structuring LLC relationships, and LLC participants have
access to the twin benefits of corporate limited liability and flow-through partnership tax
status.”).
276. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 119.
277. See Miller, supra note 249, at 1610 (citing Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC
Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small
Business, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 881 (1995); Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions
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Accordingly, one scholar contends that the close corporation form was “a
misbegotten compromise”278 and has proved to be an “evolutionary dead
end.”279
It is not clear, however, that the LLC is a panacea for shareholder
oppression. First, if the relationships among investors cause minority
shareholders to underestimate the possibility of future oppression, the same
departure from rational behavior will be exhibited when investors choose
the business form. Moving the problem does not answer it.280 Also,
although the LLC form offers significant flexibility, investors must bargain
for governance terms, and their difficulty in creating an operating
agreement that deals appropriately with all possibilities is substantially
identical to the problem close corporation shareholders face in negotiating
articles of incorporation, by-laws, and shareholder agreements.281
Moreover, in response to estate and gift tax rules that provide a lower
valuation for tax purposes only if the children’s shares are not liquid, most
LLC statutes have been amended to eliminate default exit rights.282 Thus,
minority investors who choose an LLC are locked in by the default rules
and vulnerable to mistreatment by the majority, just as they would be in a
close corporation.283
As recent LLC caselaw illustrates, courts must either apply the equitable
principles evolved over long centuries of experience in the English and
United States courts or else accept serious injustice in individual cases
when the terms of the literal agreement depart in obvious ways from the
parties’ intent. For instance, in VGS, Inc. v. Castiel,284 a founding member
lost control of his LLC, despite having bargained for the right to appoint
Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 BUS. LAW. 427, 428 (1991)). Although the
LLC statutes contain default terms, and some, unlike Delaware, include mandatory fiduciary
duties, “[t]he statutes typically assume that the individual owners will develop their own
LLC operating agreements that define their respective rights, responsibilities, and remedies.”
Id. at 1610–11.
278. RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 252.
279. Id. at 102.
280. See Miller, supra note 249, at 1612 (finding that “classic ‘squeeze-out techniques,’
which have a long history in the close corporation setting of the past fifty years, are now
surfacing in the context of the LLC”).
281. For an argument that courts should apply a full panoply of contract principles,
including unconscionability, when parties waive fiduciary obligations in an LLC agreement,
see Larry A. DiMatteo, Policing Limited Liability Companies Under Contract Law, 46 AM.
BUS. L.J. 279 (2009). The approach Professor DiMatteo recommends contrasts with this
Article’s approach because it seems designed to limit the parties’ ability to tailor their
bargain. See id. at 287 (identifying ways courts could apply dissolution statutes to create exit
rights where appropriate, “[e]ven where the operating agreement contains a ‘no-exit’
provision”). Although courts might in rare cases refuse to enforce the parties’ intended
bargain, my focus here is on the use of equitable contract provisions to fill gaps in the
parties’ agreement, furthering their actual intent.
282. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 179–80.
283. Id. at 180 (“Removal of buyout rights from LLCs has the perverse secondary effect
of forcing lawmakers to provide a backup exit right. Therefore, judicial dissolution, which
had brought so much unpredictability to close corporations, now haunts the LLCs that
replaced them.”).
284. No. C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000).
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two of the three members of the Board of Managers.285 The independent
member of the Board, who held a minority interest in the LLC, convinced
the appointed member to defect and to effectuate a merger of the LLC into a
corporation, relegating the original member to a minority position.286
The founding member’s ouster violated none of the literal terms of the
parties’ bargain. The Delaware Court of Chancery observed that while the
founding member would certainly have removed the faithless member of
the Board, if given notice of the proposed merger, “the LLC Act, read
literally, does not require notice . . . .”287 Yet the court further reasoned that
the purpose of the statute was to enable “LLC managers to take quick,
efficient action in situations where a minority of managers could not block
or adversely affect the course set by the majority even if they were
notified . . . .”288 That purpose was not advanced because the founding
member “had the power to prevent any Board decision with which he
disagreed.”289 The court rescinded the merger, relying on “a classic maxim
of equity—‘equity looks to the intent rather than to the form.’”290 Thus,
while there are substantial differences between LLCs and close
corporations, the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing establishes
common ground.291
Finally, whether or not oppression analysis applies in the LLC context,
the new choice of business form should not undermine existing protection
of shareholders in close corporations. To the extent the LLC form gives
greater weight to the explicit terms of the parties’ bargain, as embodied in
the operating agreement,292 the distinct treatment only means that investors
who choose the corporate form (and who could have chosen LLC form)
285. Ironically, this bargained-for protection left him more exposed than he would have
been had he relied on “the statutorily sanctioned mechanism of approval by members
owning a majority of the LLC’s equity interests.” Id. at *4. If the court chose to apply a
formalistic contract interpretation, the express decision to reject the default protection would
be presumed deliberate and informed, and the court would have no reason to consider
evidence of overall intent.
286. See id. at *2. The founding member of the LLC was also excluded from the board of
directors of the newly-formed corporation. See id.
287. Id. at *4.
288. Id.
289. Id. at *1.
290. Id. at *4 (citations omitted). The court’s interpretation of the LLC Act (which
formed the basis of the parties’ bargain) gave priority to considerations of equity. Thus, the
analysis was contractual in the modern rather than formal economic sense. The court also
described its holding in terms of the “duty of loyalty” members owe to the LLC and one
another and to a general obligation of “good faith.” Id. The connection the court intends to
draw between these fiduciary obligations and the equitable interpretation of contract is not
entirely clear. For further discussion, see Mark J. Loewenstein, The Diverging Meaning of
Good Faith, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 433, 450 (2009) (arguing that Castiel is best understood as
an example of contractual good faith analysis).
291. See, e.g., Adlerstein v. Wertheimer, No. Civ.A. 19101, 2002 WL 205684, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 25, 2002) (evaluating adequacy of notice to close corporation shareholder and
observing that plaintiff’s “more persuasive . . . arguments are predicated largely on . . . VGS,
Inc. v. Castiel”).
292. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399, 2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar.
23, 2009) (distinguishing freedom of contract in LLC from more limited freedom in
corporate context).
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may be presumed to have chosen the existing protections available in most
jurisdictions for minority shareholders.293
In sum, because the duty of good faith and fair dealing is an implied term
in all contracts and opportunistic conduct is likely to be similar in LLCs and
close corporations, courts should apply substantially the same oppression
analysis in either context. However, if courts take a narrow and literalistic
approach to the interpretation of LLC agreements, that novel approach
stands in sharp contrast both with courts’ longstanding willingness to
protect minority shareholders from oppression and the equitable principles
built into modern contract law more generally.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of methodology, contrasting views of contract theory
contribute to the corporate governance debate by treating the framework for
analysis as part of the discussion rather than a condition for it.294
Commentators will continue to disagree about the appropriate scope of
minority shareholder protection, but it would be a marked improvement if
they seemed to be partaking in the same discussion.295 In broader context,
Professor Stephen Bainbridge has gone so far as to conclude that “[a]s a
matter of intellectual interest, the debate over the contractual nature of the
firm is over” and “[c]ontractarians and noncontractarians no longer have
much of interest to say to one another; indeed, they barely speak the same
language.”296 As this Article has shown, though, we need not simply agree
to disagree; the language of contract is itself a useful locus of debate.
A contractual approach to close corporation law does not require courts
to abandon minority shareholders to the explicit terms of their bargain,
regardless of whether those terms are consistent with the parties’ reasonable
expectations. If the corporation is a contract, it is a relational contract
intended to endure over time and not a discrete, bargained-for exchange.
Indeed, judicial protection of vulnerable minority shareholders conflicts

293. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 253 (“Small firms may prefer the comfort of
corporate restrictions on opting out of fiduciary duty and mandatory remedies for majority
shareholder oppression.”).
294. Cf. JOHN SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY 32 (1998) (noting that certain
propositions cannot meaningfully be debated, because any discussion presupposes their
existence). For instance, “you can’t . . . settle the issue about the existence of the real world,
because any such settling presupposes the existence of the real world.” Id. Thus, “realism is
not a theory at all but the framework within which it is possible to have theories.” Id. By
contrast, we can and should choose intelligently among the available frameworks for
understanding shareholder relationships in close corporations. The standard law and
economics framework may cause certain choices to appear inevitable once applied, but the
framework itself can be challenged.
295. In many respects, the terms of the debate over shareholder remedies have remained
unchanged since the earliest exchange of views. Compare EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 1 (defending the standard law and economics perspective), with J.A.C. Hetherington &
Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the
Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977) (supporting minority
shareholder oppression remedies, including a right of exit).
296. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 31.
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with private ordering only if we assume the artificially rational world of
standard economics. But shareholders live in the real world, not in the
pages of a game theory treatise, and the ties of family and friendship, the
social norms of business, and the constraints imposed by transaction costs
all impact the likelihood that the parties will negotiate adequate protections
against possible future discord.

